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CRIMINAL LAW 
MASS INCARCERATION PARADIGM SHIFT?: 
CONVERGENCE IN AN AGE OF 
DIVERGENCE 
MUGAMBI JOUET* 
The peculiar harshness of modern American justice has led to a 
vigorous scholarly debate about the roots of mass incarceration and its 
divergence from humanitarian sentencing norms prevalent in other Western 
democracies.  Even though the United States reached virtually world-record 
imprisonment levels between 1983 and 2010, the Supreme Court never found 
a prison term to be “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth 
Amendment.  By countenancing extreme punishments with no equivalent 
elsewhere in the West, such as life sentences for petty recidivists, the Justices’ 
reasoning came to exemplify the exceptional nature of American justice.  
Many scholars concluded that punitiveness had become its defining norm. 
Yet a quiet revolution in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, a wave of 
reforms, and other social developments suggest that American penal 
philosophy may be inching toward norms—dignity, proportionality, 
legitimacy, and rehabilitation—that have checked draconian prison terms in 
Europe, Canada, and beyond.  In 2010, the Supreme Court began limiting 
the scope of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles in a series of 
landmark Eighth Amendment cases.  Partly drawing upon the principles in 
these decisions, twenty-two states have abolished life without parole 
categorically for juveniles, providing them more protections than under the 
Eighth Amendment.  The narrow focus on the differences between juveniles 
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and adults in the aftermath of these reforms obscured American law’s 
increasing recognition of humanitarian norms that are hardly age-
dependent—and strikingly similar to those in other Western democracies.  
Historiography sheds light on why the academy has largely overlooked this 
relative paradigm shift.  As America faced mass incarceration of an 
extraordinary magnitude, research in recent decades has focused on 
divergence, not convergence. 
This Article advances a comparative theory of punishment to analyze 
these developments.  In the United States and throughout the West, 
approaches toward punishment are impermanent social constructs, as they 
historically tend to fluctuate between punitive and humanitarian concerns.  
Such paradigm shifts can lead to periods of international divergence or 
convergence in penal philosophy.  Notwithstanding the ebb and flow of penal 
attitudes, certain long-term trends have emerged in Western societies.  They 
encompass a narrowing scope of offenders eligible for the harshest 
sentences, a reduction in the application of these sentences, and intensifying 
social divides about their morality.  Restrictions on lifelong imprisonment 
for juveniles and growing social polarization over mass incarceration in the 
United States may reflect this movement.  However, American justice 
appears particularly susceptible to unpredictable swings and backlashes.  
While this state of impermanence suggests that the reform movement might 
reverse itself, it also demonstrates that American justice may keep 
converging toward humanitarian sentencing norms, which were influential 
in the United States before the mass incarceration era. 
Two patterns regarding the broader evolution of criminal punishment 
ultimately stand out: cyclicality and steadiness of direction.  The patterns 
evoke a seismograph that regularly swings up or down despite moving 
steadily in a given direction.  American justice may cyclically oscillate 
between repressive or humanitarian aspirations, and simultaneously 
converge with other Western democracies in gradually limiting or abolishing 
the harshest punishments over the long term. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mass incarceration has been such an enduring and extraordinary 
phenomenon that it has profoundly shaped the notion that justice in the 
United States is inherently harsher than in Europe, where more humane 
conceptions of punishment are influential.  Because prison population 
explosion emerged approximately four decades ago,1 many jurists have 
known no other penal system in America.  The Supreme Court’s reasoning 
only reinforced this image.  As America faced imprisonment levels on a scale 
virtually unprecedented in global history,2 the Court recurrently concluded 
that the Eighth Amendment’s bar on “cruel and unusual punishments” 
effectively does not cover draconian prison terms.3  These circumstances 
came to obscure how conceptions of justice in America have historically been 
impermanent, ebbing and flowing between repressive and humanitarian 
approaches. 
Despite the extensive scholarly focus on America’s divergence from 
Europe in the mass incarceration era,4 a remarkable measure of convergence 
 
 1 See generally Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN. L. REV. 933, 939 
(2016) (discussing the gradual surge of the U.S. incarceration rate from the 1970s to the 
2000s). 
 2 See generally CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, US RATES OF INCARCERATION: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE, NAT’L COUNCIL CRIME & DELINQ. 3 (2006). 
 3 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (upholding constitutionality of fifty-
year-to-life sentence for petty recidivist); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) 
(plurality opinion) (upholding constitutionality of twenty-five-year-to-life sentence for petty 
recidivist); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (plurality opinion) (upholding 
constitutionality of life imprisonment without parole for first-time felon convicted of 
possessing a large quantity of cocaine). Prior to Harmelin, the last Supreme Court decision to 
hold a prison sentence unconstitutional was Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983), which 
found life without parole “cruel and unusual punishment” for a petty offender who had issued 
a no account check for $100. 
 4 Scholars have advanced diverse theories about the causes of mass incarceration and the 
United States’ divergence from norms that have tempered punitiveness in Europe, Canada, 
and other democratic societies. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: 
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (describing mass incarceration 
as primarily the product of institutional racism); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: 
CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002) [hereinafter “THE CULTURE OF 
CONTROL”] (arguing that various social factors shaped harsher attitudes toward crime and 
706 JOUET [Vol. 109 
has received scant attention.  American penal philosophy may be inching 
toward penal norms that have checked ruthless prison terms in modern 
Europe: dignity, proportionality, legitimacy, and rehabilitation.  As the 
Supreme Court recognized these norms in landmark decisions limiting 
juveniles’ eligibility for life without parole—Graham v. Florida,5 Miller v. 
Alabama,6 and Montgomery v. Louisiana7—the evolution of juvenile justice 
overshadowed how these are non-age-dependent sentencing principles that 
could also protect adult prisoners.  The way that American jurists 
increasingly think of juveniles’ rights resembles the way that European 
jurists tend to think of the rights of both juveniles and adults.  Yet, prior to 
Graham, dissenting Justices had already advanced these principles in 
 
contributed to mass incarceration); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: 
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF THE NATURAL ORDER (2011) (analyzing the interrelated 
evolution of capitalism and penal systems since the nineteenth century); MUGAMBI JOUET, 
EXCEPTIONAL AMERICA: WHAT DIVIDES AMERICANS FROM THE WORLD AND FROM EACH 
OTHER 195 (2017) (arguing that mass incarceration is the product of a “poisonous cocktail 
blending multiple peculiar ingredients,” including atypical institutions, a shift in judicial 
philosophy, limited socioeconomic solidarity, racial discrimination, religious traditionalism, 
populism, anti-intellectualism, sensationalized media coverage of crime, a subculture of 
violence, a narrow conception of human dignity, and skepticism of international human rights 
standards); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW 
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (providing data suggesting that prosecutors were 
particularly instrumental in driving mass incarceration because of their increased tendency to 
file felony charges); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON 
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007) 
(analyzing how changing conceptions of American government in the post-New Deal era 
contributed to mass incarceration); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (identifying a broad range of institutional, legal, and social factors 
behind mass incarceration); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND 
THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (describing how the historical 
trend in the United States has been to normalize the harsh treatment of low-status persons, 
unlike in continental Europe); Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the 
Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 385 (2018) (analyzing the influential role of 
legislators, among other social actors, in driving mass incarceration by passing harsh 
sentencing laws); Kleinfeld, supra note 1, at 939 (exploring the “great divergence” between 
America and Europe regarding criminal punishment). 
 5 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (barring life imprisonment without parole for 
juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses). Graham partly stems from the Court’s abolition 
of the juvenile death penalty. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005) (reasoning 
that “[t]he differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well 
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient 
culpability”). 
 6 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that life in prison without parole 
cannot be a mandatory punishment for juveniles convicted of homicide). 
 7 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016) (holding that Miller established a 
substantive constitutional rule that should apply retroactively to teenagers mandatorily 
sentenced to life without parole). 
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controversial 5-4 decisions affirming life sentences inflicted on nonviolent 
adult offenders.8  A difference of one vote would therefore have led to earlier 
convergence,9 further calling into question essentialism about the inherent 
harshness of American justice.  Strikingly, in the Graham line of decisions, 
the Court adopted multiple sentencing principles that it once rejected and that 
are the norm in Europe.10 
This Eighth Amendment paradigm shift may be a microcosm of broader 
developments in American penal philosophy.  After decades of relative 
indifference, mass incarceration has become the object of greater public 
concern, thereby leading to diverse state and federal reforms benefiting both 
juveniles and adults.11  While scholars have downplayed the Supreme Court’s 
role in penal reform by emphasizing that criminal justice is primarily run at 
the state and local levels, they have neglected how a symbiotic relationship 
can exist between its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and state 
reform movements.12  Tellingly, state reformers nationwide invoked the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery as a 
justification to make their juvenile justice systems less punitive.13  As of 
October 2019, twenty-two states had abolished life without parole 
categorically for juveniles—providing them more protections than what the 
Eighth Amendment requires—a four-fold increase in the number of 
abolitionist states since 2012.14 
 
 8 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77 (Souter, J., dissenting); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 35 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 
263, 285 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 381 (1982) 
(per curiam) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 9 See id. 
 10 See infra Section II. 
 11 See infra Section III. 
 12 See infra note 404 and accompanying text. 
 13 See generally CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS: THE 
FIVE-YEAR GROUNDSWELL OF STATE BANS ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILDREN (2016) 
[hereinafter “CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS”]; see also 
infra Section III. 
 14 CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, States that Ban Life without Parole 
for Children, https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/media-resources/states-that-ban-life/ 
[https://perma.cc/3ZFN-M3UG] (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) [hereinafter “CAMPAIGN FOR THE 
FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, States that Ban Life without Parole for Children”]; see also State 
v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 346 (Wash. 2018) (abolishing life without parole for juveniles under 
the Washington Constitution); State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016) (abolishing 
life without parole for juveniles under the Iowa Constitution); CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR 
SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS, supra note 13 (describing nationwide reform 
movement to abolish life imprisonment without parole for juveniles). The shift has not been 
uniform, as various jurisdictions balked at the notion of treating juveniles less punitively. 
Illustratively, “[t]o the dismay of many penal reformers and juvenile advocates, the state of 
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Overlooking the broader view of the Graham, Miller, and Montgomery 
trilogy, jurists have largely reduced these cases to a narrow “juveniles are 
different” doctrine.  Focusing on neurological and social science that the 
Justices cited to support their conclusion regarding the diminished culpability 
of immature teenagers,15 experts have mainly identified the Graham line of 
cases as stepping stones toward expanding the rights of juveniles, not 
adults.16 
This Article examines a hypothesis with wider implications: whether 
American penal philosophy is inching toward norms that protect all people 
from draconian prison terms in contemporary Western democracies.  Under 
this hypothesis, approaches toward punishment are impermanent social 
constructs, as they tend to cyclically fluctuate between repressive and 
humanitarian concerns.  Such paradigm shifts can lead to periods of 
international divergence or convergence in penal philosophy.  After a lengthy 
period of divergence, American justice may thus be drawing closer to norms 
that have tempered punitiveness in Europe.  While the emergence of the 
 
Pennsylvania reacted to the Miller decision by hastily enacting [harsh] legislation.” Marie 
Gottschalk, Sentenced to Life: Penal Reform and the Most Severe Sanctions, 9 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 353, 359 (2013). Pennsylvania thus replaced mandatory life without parole for 
juveniles with a dismal choice: life without parole (again) or 25 to 35 years in prison prior to 
eligibility for parole. Id. 
 15 See generally Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court 
Decisions About Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NATURE REV. NEUROSCIENCE 513, 
515–16 (2013) (“Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions”). 
 16 See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS, supra 
note 13, at 4 (discussing the “growing momentum across state legislatures to reform criminal 
sentencing laws to prohibit children from being sentenced to life without parole”); Beth 
Caldwell, Banished for Life: Deportation of Juvenile Offenders as Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2261 (2013) (suggesting that immigration authorities apply 
Graham and Miller’s reasoning to juvenile deportation proceedings); Barry C. Feld, A Slower 
Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without 
Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 64–65 (2008) (arguing that Roper’s 
reasoning be extended to juvenile life imprisonment cases); Sarah French Russell, Review for 
Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 
373 (2014) (arguing that Graham and Miller should lead to reforms in juvenile parole 
procedures); Robin Walker Sterling, Juvenile-Sex-Offender Registration: An Impermissible 
Life Sentence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 295 (2015) (proposing reforms to teenage sex offender 
registration based on Graham and Miller). By contrast, few scholars have especially focused 
on extending Graham and its progeny to the rights of adult prisoners. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Simon, Dignity and Risk: The Long Road from Graham v. Florida to Abolition of Life without 
Parole, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 282 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012); 
William W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1109, 1113 (2010) (arguing that Graham should lead to heightened constitutional review of 
all life without parole sentences); Michael M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham 
and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087 (2013) (discussing prospects for broadening the 
Court’s juvenile jurisprudence to adults). 
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Graham, Miller, and Montgomery jurisprudence provides a lay of the land—
an ecology of sentencing in modern America—the Article is not about 
doctrine but about a broader phenomenon in the evolution of penal 
philosophy.  These cases illustrate the phenomenon, yet the Article’s final 
section provides other examples, such as the evolution of the death penalty 
in America and the rest of the Western world.17 
Moreover, alongside these cycles of divergence and convergence, 
another pattern may be at play: a long-term trend toward limiting or 
abolishing the harshest criminal punishments in the West.  Scholars have 
often described the United States as an exception to this trend, and justifiably 
so given the harshness of its penal system.18  Nevertheless, Supreme Court 
decisions and state reforms restricting the scope of life without parole, the 
polarization of American society over mass incarceration, the decline of the 
death penalty, and other social developments may reflect the long-term 
evolution of punishment in Western democracies.  From this angle, America 
may be a laggard rather than the permanent exception in circumscribing the 
harshest punishments.19  Even though the relative steadiness of this long-term 
abolitionist trend may appear incompatible with the unsteadiness of cyclical 
attitudes toward punishment, we will see that this is not necessarily the case 
after widening the historical lens.20 
The Article therefore identifies two simultaneous historical patterns—
cyclicality and steadiness of direction—influencing criminal punishments in 
Western societies.  It is not a historicist account affirming that the evolution 
of punishment follows rigid historical laws.21  These patterns are amenable 
to change or reversal, as history does not inherently flow in a particular 
direction.  Still, examining such patterns can help understand a given 
historical period.  The magnitude of mass incarceration in the United States 
has at times eclipsed these historical undercurrents and fostered essentialism 
about the ruthlessness of American justice.  While scholars have advanced 
insightful theories regarding the emergence of mass incarceration,22 an 
 
 17 See infra Section III. 
 18 See generally supra note 4. 
 19 See generally David Garland, Capital Punishment and American Culture, 7 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 347, 355 (2005). 
 20 See infra Section III. 
 21 “Historicism” has multiple definitions, which can range from historical analysis in 
general to distinct philosophical understandings. See Dwight E. Lee & Robert N. Beck, The 
Meaning of Historicism, 59 AM. HIST. REV. 568, 577 (1954). In this Article, the term refers to 
the notion that a set of “laws” steers the history of humankind, such as the claim that societies 
inherently evolve toward progress. See also KARL R. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM 
3, 5, 41, 81 (2d ed. 1976) (calling into question the existence of historical laws). 
 22 See supra note 4. 
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intricate phenomenon defying a single explanation,23 the patterns that this 
Article describes are another piece of the puzzle. 
Avoiding a simple dichotomy between America and Europe, this Article 
also considers the rest of the Western world: Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand.24  Humanitarian sentencing norms appear to have gone the farthest 
in Europe, although they are influential in Canada and play a non-negligible 
role in Australia and New Zealand.25  These circumstances suggest that 
humanitarian sentencing norms are not fundamentally “European” and are 
evolving in diverse Western societies.  These developments are relevant to 
Émile Durkheim’s sociological theory regarding the gradual expansion of 
prisoners’ rights in liberal democracies.26  We will accordingly examine the 
implications of Durkheim’s century-old theory, particularly because it 
addressed the norm of “dignity,”27 which has gained traction in the United 
States and other modern Western democracies.28 
Research on international convergence has primarily focused on a 
different matter: the U.S. Supreme Court’s contentious citation of global 
standards as persuasive authority in several Eighth Amendment cases.29  
 
 23 Carol Steiker has observed how academics have offered a “wide range of explanatory 
accounts . . . about the divergence of the United States in criminal and capital justice policies.” 
Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and Contingency, 125 HARV. L. REV. 760, 764 (2012) 
(book review). The intriguing validity of disparate theories evokes “the parable of the blind 
men describing an elephant based on their examination of a single part (the trunk, the ear, the 
tail, and so forth),” as scholars may identify “a different creature depending on the nature of 
the chosen focal point.” Id. 
 24 Legal scholars, sociologists, and political scientists typically favor comparing the 
United States to other Western nations sharing democratic political systems, industrialized 
economies, and relatively similar cultural roots. On the comparison of the United States to 
other Western nations, see generally JOUET, supra note 4; JOHN W. KINGDON, AMERICA THE 
UNUSUAL (1999); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED 
SWORD (1997). Russia and certain Russian-leaning former Soviet bloc countries like Belarus 
are not normally considered Western nations. JOUET, supra note 4, at 6. 
 25 See infra Section II. 
 26 Émile Durkheim, Deux lois de l’évolution pénale, 4 ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE 65 (1900). 
 27 Id. at 88–90. 
 28 See infra Section II.A. 
 29 Martha Minow has shed light on this controversy. “In recent years, I have watched the 
swirling debate over whether the United States courts should consult international or 
comparative law,” she writes, explaining that it is a puzzling debate since “no one disagrees 
that United States judges have long consulted and referred to [such] materials.” Martha 
Minow, The Controversial Status of International and Comparative Law in the United States, 
52 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1, 1–2 (2010), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/10511098 [https
://perma.cc/92UK-5W2H]; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study 
“Transnational” Law, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 97, 129 n.47 (2011) (“In recent years, there has 
been extensive debate about what role the use and interpretation of ‘foreign’ or international 
law should have in American constitutional jurisprudence.”); e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
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Scholarship has mostly ignored the dimensions of convergence I identify in 
this Article, including a revealing citation across the Atlantic.  The European 
Court of Human Rights pointed to the Supreme Court’s Graham opinion for 
support when abolishing life sentences with no possibility of release for 
European prisoners.30  This is partly because Graham and its progeny 
recognized core principles resembling those in European penal philosophy: 
i) punishments must not violate human dignity; ii) punishments must be 
proportional to culpability; iii) punishments must serve a legitimate penal 
purpose; and iv) punishments should generally provide hope for 
rehabilitation and release. 
First, this Article describes how justice in America and other Western 
democracies diverged tremendously for decades, which underscores the 
significance of subsequent developments.  The Eighth Amendment’s 
interpretation is a microcosm of this historical period.  Between 1983 and 
2010, the Supreme Court never found a prison sentence “cruel and unusual 
punishment.”31  As America faced mass incarceration on virtually world-
record levels, a slim majority of Justices concluded that even inflicting life 
sentences on petty recidivists, such as shoplifters, was not “cruel and 
unusual.”32 
Second, I suggest that American penal philosophy may be converging 
toward humanitarian norms—dignity, proportionality, legitimacy, and 
rehabilitation—that are prevalent in European nations, Canada, and various 
other liberal democracies.  Beginning in 2010, the Justices applied these 
principles in juvenile life without parole cases, but I present the hypothesis 
 
48, 81 (2010) (underlining that “the United States is the only Nation that imposes life without 
parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders,” which the unratified Convention on the 
Rights of the Child forbids); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (finding that “the 
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the 
juvenile death penalty,” which would violate the Convention on the Rights of the Child); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (noting that “within the world community, 
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is 
overwhelmingly disapproved”). 
 30 Case of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom, 66069/09, 130/10, and 3896/10, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2013) [hereinafter “Vinter”], ¶ 73 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 48). Graham was 
among the diverse sources that the European Judges cited in their vast survey of international 
and foreign law barring life sentences. See id. ¶¶ 59–75. 
 31 Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G. REP. 49, 49 (2010) (“Before 
Graham it had been almost three decades since the Court had found a noncapital sentence 
unconstitutional . . . .”); Eva Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of 
Humane Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 148 (2007) 
(noting that since Solem, a 1983 decision, the Justices “never reversed a non-death sentence 
on the ground that it was too severe for the crime of conviction”). 
 32 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 63 (2003). 
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that these principles are not fundamentally age-dependent, which is why 
European courts notably tend to apply them to all prisoners.  For instance, a 
person cannot forfeit her dignity by entering adulthood, as dignity is a 
principle rooted in the intrinsic worth of a human being.  Historiography, the 
history of historical studies, helps explain why these signs of convergence 
have received limited attention.  Given the extraordinary harshness of 
American justice in the age of mass incarceration, scholarship in recent 
decades has primarily focused on analyzing its divergence from European 
penal philosophy.33 
Third, I present a comparative theory on the historical evolution of 
American justice to shed light on these developments.  Approaches toward 
punishment are impermanent social constructs that ebb and flow between 
repressive and rehabilitative aspirations.  Such cycles are not unique to the 
United States, as they exist throughout the West, from Europe to Canada to 
Australia to New Zealand.  Depending on the period, the sociopolitical 
climate may lead penal attitudes in diverse Western nations to move in 
similar or opposite directions.  These circumstances are among the reasons 
why the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as state courts and legislatures, may be 
converging toward humanitarian sentencing norms prevalent in other 
Western democracies following decades of divergence.  Yet the modern 
American penal system appears particularly susceptible to swings and 
backlashes.  Although this state of impermanence suggests that the quiet 
revolution in American penal philosophy might be stopped in its tracks or 
potentially rolled back, it confirms that penal norms in America are not 
locked in stone and could continue converging with Europe, Canada, and 
beyond.  Indeed, beside the cyclicality of penal attitudes, certain long-term 
trends stand out in Western societies, including narrowed eligibility for the 
harshest punishments, reduced frequency of these punishments, and 
intensifying social divides about their acceptability, which may eventually 
lead to their abolition.34 
While mass incarceration is a multifaceted problem that cannot be 
resolved by a silver bullet,35 this Article ultimately suggests that an Eighth 
Amendment paradigm shift could be a step toward reducing America’s 
immense prison population.  Experts generally agree that the reform 
proposals that have received the most public attention and support, such as 
decriminalizing marijuana and ending the “War on Drugs,” cannot 
 
 33 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 34 See Garland, supra note 19, at 355. 
 35 Scholars have identified a host of factors shaping mass incarceration, thereby 
suggesting the need to envision reform from multiple angles. See generally supra notes 4, 23 
and accompanying text. 
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unilaterally end mass incarceration.36  By the same token, the Supreme Court 
or other federal authorities cannot singlehandedly tackle mass incarceration, 
as criminal justice in America is mainly controlled by state and local 
governments.  We will nonetheless see that a symbiotic relationship can exist 
between the Court’s decisions and reforms by state actors.  Yet Justices may 
prove more receptive to some claims than others.  For example, addressing 
institutional racism may be indispensable to lasting criminal justice reform, 
but the Supreme Court has presently closed the door to such systemic 
constitutional challenges.37  By contrast, the Eighth Amendment’s 
reinvigoration could restrict sentences that disproportionately harm racial 
and ethnic minorities, as well as socioeconomically disadvantaged whites.  
The reasoning of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery may thus provide 
guidance to ensure that all persons receive humane sentences.  Although U.S. 
juvenile justice remains very harsh by international standards, it is the sphere 
of American justice where the principles of dignity, proportionality, 
legitimacy, and rehabilitation have gained the most traction, partly due to the 
Supreme Court’s impetus.  From juvenile justice, these principles may 
contribute to a broader paradigm shift in the penal system. 
I. DIVERGENCE: AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND MASS 
INCARCERATION 
Without taking measure of how American law embraced extraordinary 
punitiveness for decades, one cannot fully grasp the changing penal 
landscape following Supreme Court decisions and state reforms gradually 
restricting the scope of life without parole since 2010.38  Accordingly, this 
 
 36 See generally James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the 
New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 24–25 (2012) (emphasizing that mass incarceration is 
not “exclusively (or overwhelmingly) a result of the War on Drugs,” as “drug offenders 
constitute only a quarter of our nation’s prisoners, while violent offenders make up a much 
larger share: one-half”); see also U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2015 14 
(2016) (indicating that 52.9% of state prisoners were convicted for violent crimes). 
 37 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320 (1987) (holding that statistical evidence of 
institutional racism in capital sentencing is irrelevant, as defendants must prove specific intent 
of discrimination in their individual case—a nearly unattainable standard of proof without 
examining systemic patterns). Many scholars have analyzed how McCleskey and other 
decisions have precluded successful constitutional challenges to institutional racism in the 
penal system. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Race and Proportionality Since McCleskey v. 
Kemp (1987): Different Actors with Mixed Strategies of Denial and Avoidance, 39 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143, 143 (2007); John J. Donohue, Empirical Analysis and the Fate of 
Capital Punishment, 11 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 84, 85, 94, 105 (2016); Ian F. 
Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial 
Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1835, 1841–42 (2000). 
 38 See infra Sections II and III. 
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section will present evidence suggesting that American justice profoundly 
diverges from humanitarian norms prevalent in other Western democracies, 
before considering evidence that American justice may be converging toward 
these norms in the next section. 
At the outset, it may reasonably appear as if Americans approach 
criminal punishment from a radically different angle than Europeans, if not 
the rest of the international community.  The United States has the highest 
incarceration rate worldwide.39  It is home to 5% of the world’s population 
but a quarter of the world’s prisoners.40  Leaving aside Stalinist Russia, there 
are few historical examples of mass incarceration on such a colossal scale.41  
Mass incarceration is even more striking if one parses the “astronomical” 
incarceration rate for African-Americans.42  The peculiar nature of mass 
incarceration further comes to light when comparing the United States not 
only to European countries, but also to the rest of the Western world: Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand.43  America’s incarceration rate is three to ten 
times higher than those of other modern Western democracies.44  In the words 
of David Garland, mass incarceration “is an unprecedented event in the 
history of the U.S. and, more generally, in the history of liberal democracy.”45 
My research has described how mass incarceration reflects “American 
exceptionalism,” an idea often misunderstood or misrepresented as a faith in 
American superiority.46  The primary definition of this storied concept has 
historically been that America is an exception, objectively and descriptively, 
 
 39 WORLD PRISON BRIEF, PRISON POPULATION RATE, http://www.prisonstudies.org/
highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All [https://perma.cc
/L6AJ-NZ4S] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 40 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Fact Check: Does the United States Really Have 5 Percent of the 




 41 HARTNEY, supra note 2 (comparing the incarceration rate in modern America and the 
Soviet Union in 1950). It is noteworthy that incarceration in Stalinist prisons was qualitatively 
different since it encompassed the repression of alleged dissidents. 
 42 STUNTZ, supra note 4, at 47–48 (“If the general imprisonment rate is high, the rate of 
black incarceration can fairly be called astronomical,” as in the year 2000 it “exceed[ed] by 
one-fourth the imprisonment rate in the Soviet Union in 1950—near the end of Stalin’s reign, 
the time when the population of the Soviet camps peaked”). 
 43 Regarding the definition of the Western world, see supra note 24. 
 44 See WORLD PRISON BRIEF, PRISON POPULATION RATE, supra note 39. 
 45 David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS 
IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 1 (David Garland ed., 2001). 
 46 JOUET, supra note 4, at 21–26. 
2019] MASS INCARCERATION PARADIGM SHIFT 715 
especially compared to other Western democracies.47  Distinctive features of 
American history, culture, law, politics, economic attitudes, religious beliefs, 
and race relations have thus shaped peculiar ways of thinking about crime.  
For instance, America has historically been the Western democracy with the 
highest proportion of racial and ethnic minorities, which has fostered a 
greater degree of institutional racism compared to European nations.48  Other 
features of American exceptionalism, including the relative weight of 
populism, anti-intellectual skepticism of expert knowledge, Christian 
fundamentalism, and market fundamentalism have also been part of the 
“poisonous cocktail” making modern American justice exceptionally harsh, 
counter-productive, and inegalitarian.49 
A defining feature of American exceptionalism and mass incarceration 
long seemed to be the rejection of humanitarian sentencing principles that 
have limited punitiveness in Europe: dignity, proportionality, legitimacy, and 
rehabilitation.50  Marie Gottschalk illustratively described how “[o]ver the 
past 40 years or so, retribution has become a central feature of U.S. penal 
policy, supplanting rehabilitation and even public safety as the chief aim.”51 
As Justice Antonin Scalia pointedly asserted during oral arguments in an 
Eighth Amendment case, “modern penology has abandoned that 
rehabilitation thing, and they no longer call prisons 
reformatories . . . [P]unishment is the criterion now.  Deserved punishment 
for crime.”52  Scalia went on to suggest that a punishment’s lack of 
rehabilitative purpose was therefore “irrelevant.”53  Jonathan Simon has 
equally observed how “[life without parole] defines the logic of 
contemporary [American] penality . . . in its embrace of a totalizing promise 
of prison incapacitation extended to the very limits of life, and unmediated 
by any further consideration of the prisoner as a distinct human being.”54  By 
contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has barred life without parole 
as an inhumane punishment negating the value of prisoners’ lives, thereby 
 
 47 Id.; see also generally JACK P. GREENE, THE INTELLECTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
AMERICA: EXCEPTIONALISM AND IDENTITY FROM 1942 TO 1800, 4–5 (1993); LIPSET, supra note 
43, at 18; James W. Ceaser, The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism, 1 AM. 
POL. THOUGHT 2 (2012). 
 48 JOUET, supra note 4, at 210–11. 
 49 Id. at 195. 
 50 See infra Section II. 
 51 Gottschalk, supra note 14, at 370. 
 52 Oral Argument at 18:49, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 10-9646), https://
www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-9646 [https://perma.cc/F262-DMXR]. 
 53 Id. at 19:07. 
 54 Simon, supra note 16, at 282. 
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rejecting claims that this punishment is warranted by retribution or public 
safety.55 
An overview of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
from 1980 to 2010, the age of mass incarceration, would seem to confirm 
that the humanitarian principles that have led other Western democracies to 
significantly limit or fully forbid draconian prison sentences are incompatible 
with the ethos of American justice.  After all, even as the United States 
practically reached world-record imprisonment levels, the Court repeatedly 
held that extremely harsh prison terms do not violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s bar on “cruel and unusual punishments.”  This approach 
mirrored wider social developments in how Americans thought about crime, 
as Supreme Court decisions do not exist in a vacuum. 
In Rummel v. Estelle, a 1980 decision, the Court reasoned that the Eighth 
Amendment offers essentially no protection against prison terms lacking 
proportionality to culpability.56  It thus affirmed the life sentence that a 
defendant received under Texas’s “three strikes” statute for several minor 
nonviolent offenses: fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 worth of 
goods or services, passing a forged check for $28.36, and obtaining $120.75 
by false pretenses.57  Over the dissenting opinion of four Justices, the 
majority announced, “[O]ne could argue without fear of contradiction by any 
decision of this Court that . . . the length of the sentence actually imposed 
[for a felony] is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.”58  Put otherwise, 
the Court notified state authorities that it would not preclude them from 
imposing life sentences on any convicted felons.59  It added that Eighth 
Amendment challenges should succeed only in “exceedingly rare” 
situations.60 
Two years later, Hutto v. Davis, a succinct per curiam decision, found 
no constitutional violation with a Virginia prisoner’s forty-year sentence for 
possession and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana.61  The Court 
reiterated its “reluctan[ce] to review legislatively mandated terms of 
imprisonment.”62  In a revealing twist of events, the Justices also 
 
 55 Vinter, ¶¶ 12, 21, 23, 46, 52, 119–22, 139. 
 56 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 263 (1980). 
 57 Id. at 266. 
 58 Id. at 274. 
 59 The majority provided a minor caveat by stating in a footnote that “a proportionality 
principle” might apply “if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life 
imprisonment.” Id. at 274 n.11. 
 60 Id. at 272. 
 61 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370 (1982) (per curiam). 
 62 Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274). 
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reprimanded both the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and a District Court 
for their unwillingness to follow Rummel’s narrow interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment, as these lower courts had found the forty-year sentence 
in Hutto unconstitutional notwithstanding Rummel.63  “[U]nless we wish 
anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system,” the majority wrote, “a 
precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no 
matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.”64 
Justice Lewis Powell grudgingly concurred with the Hutto majority, 
feeling bound by Rummel despite his belief that the forty-year sentence was 
“unjust and disproportionate to the offense” of possessing and distributing 
marijuana “said to have a street value of about $200.”65  Three other Justices, 
led by William Brennan, dissented in strong language denouncing the 
majority’s decision to issue a per curiam opinion “[w]ith the benefit of 
neither full briefing nor oral argument” in this important case.66  In their view, 
the majority had moved toward “the complete abdication of our 
responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment.”67 
Around this period, state and local governments adopted increasingly 
harsh sentencing laws and policies due to the rise of the “tough on crime” 
movement.68  The Supreme Court’s decisions did not cause this social shift, 
yet its majority’s reasoning tended to exemplify the evolution in American 
penal attitudes.  While rehabilitation was a core principle in American 
sentencing in prior decades, it was largely discredited.69  Critics charged that 
rehabilitation did not “work” and amounted to illegitimate, immoral 
criminal-coddling.70  Once one assumes that most offenders are incorrigible 
and nothing more than their worst acts, the next logical step is not difficult to 
envision: “Lock them up and throw away the key.”  From this angle, endless 
prison terms cannot be “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment. 
In 1983, however, the Court moved away from Rummel and Hutto’s 
narrow conception of prisoners’ rights.  The Court held in Solem v. Helm that 
it was “cruel and unusual punishment” for South Dakota to inflict life without 
 
 63 Id. at 375; see also Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 449 (W.D. Va. 1977), aff’d 
per curiam sub nom., Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981), rev’d sub nom., Hutto, 
454 U.S. at 370. 
 64 Hutto, 454 U.S. at 375. 
 65 Id. (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 66 Id. at 381 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 383. 
 68 See supra note 4. 
 69 See generally GARLAND, supra note 4, at 20, 58, 62, 143; Michael Tonry, Can Twenty-
first Century Punishment Policies Be Justified in Principle?, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS A PAST: 
HAS IT A FUTURE? 3, 7–8 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011). 
 70 GARLAND, supra note 4, at 20, 58, 62, 143. 
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parole on a petty recidivist who had issued a “no account” check for $100.71  
The main reason for the Court’s change of direction appears to be the 
evolving judicial philosophy of Justice Harry Blackmun.72  After being in the 
majority in Rummel, Blackmun joined the four Justices who had dissented in 
that precedent to form a new 5-4 majority in Solem.73  The Solem majority 
notably reasoned that the Eighth Amendment encompasses a “general 
principle of proportionality.”74  It identified three factors to determine 
whether a prison sentence is disproportional: i) “the gravity of the offense 
and harshness of the penalty”; ii) sentences imposed “in the same 
jurisdiction”; and iii) sentences for “the same crime in other jurisdictions.”75 
Nevertheless, Solem hardly seemed to spur a change in American penal 
philosophy or undermine the “tough on crime” movement.  The U.S. 
incarceration rate nearly doubled in the next decade.76 The number of 
successful Eighth Amendment challenges drawing upon Solem appears to 
have been absolutely minimal.77  Conversely, dramatically less punitive penal 
systems were becoming the norm elsewhere in the West.78  No other Western 
democracy experienced mass incarceration.79  And even those possessing 
their own versions of the “tough on crime” movement, from France to 
Canada to New Zealand, had markedly more moderate penal systems than 
 
 71 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 277 (1983). The Supreme Court has historically found 
Eighth Amendment violations in few other noncapital cases. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 98 (1976) (holding that deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs does 
not comport with the Eighth Amendment); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958) (plurality 
opinion) (holding that depriving a military deserter of his U.S. citizenship violated the Eighth 
Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (holding that sentencing a 
defendant to hard labor for falsifying an official document violated the Eighth Amendment). 
 72 Justice Blackmun’s judicial philosophy particularly evolved on the death penalty during 
his time on the Court. In his last year on the bench, he famously declared “I will no longer 
tinker with the machinery of death.” Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 73 The four Rummel dissenters were Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Lewis 
Powell, and John Paul Stevens. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
 74 Solem, 463 U.S. at 288. 
 75 Id. at 291–92. 
 76 The incarceration rate per 100,000 U.S. residents skyrocketed from 280 to 530 prisoners 
between 1983 and 1993. U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, KEY STATISTIC: INCARCERATION 
RATE (1980-2015), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=kfdetail&iid=493#Publications [https:
//perma.cc/A5Q3-AWMC] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017). 
 77 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1015 n.2 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “the parties have cited only four cases decided in the [eight] years since Solem in which 
sentences have been reversed on the basis of a proportionality analysis”). 
 78 See infra Section II. 
 79 See infra Section II. 
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the United States.80  An uncanny taste for repression appeared to be a 
dominant trait of American exceptionalism.81 
In 1991, the Supreme Court revisited the application of the Eighth 
Amendment to lengthy prison terms, but proved even less able to find 
common ground.  In Harmelin v. Michigan, a plurality decision, the Court 
eviscerated the Solem standard and concluded that the Eighth Amendment’s 
bar on “cruel and unusual punishments” does not require that a sentence be 
“proportional” to the crime except in a capital case—a doctrine known as 
“death is different.”82  The defendant in Harmelin had no prior felony 
convictions.83  He received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole after being convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine,84 a 
substantial quantity sufficient to create between 32,500 and 65,000 doses.85  
The mandatory life sentence precluded him from advancing any mitigating 
evidence at sentencing.  Justice Scalia wrote the principal opinion of the 
plurality judgment declaring: “Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but 
they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in 
various forms throughout our Nation’s history.”86  In a separate section of his 
opinion that was solely joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice 
Scalia argued that the Eighth Amendment was originally meant to “outlaw 
particular modes of punishment,” such as torture, rather than 
“disproportionate or excessive sentences.”87  Scalia asserted that “Solem was 
simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality 
guarantee.”88 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and 
David Souter, authored Harmelin’s controlling concurring opinion.  Unlike 
Scalia, Kennedy considered that the Eighth Amendment “encompasses a 
 
 80 See infra notes 216, 381–385 and accompanying text. 
 81 On the meaning of American exceptionalism, see supra notes 46–47, and 
accompanying text. 
 82 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995–96 (plurality opinion) (noting that solely death sentences 
require individualized review under the Eighth Amendment given the “qualitative difference 
between death and all other penalties”). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 961. 
 85 Id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 86 Id. at 995 (plurality opinion) (stating that “mandatory death sentences abounded in our 
first Penal Code”). 
 87 Id. at 975–85 (emphasis in original). 
 88 Id. at 994–95. 
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narrow proportionality principle.”89  Yet Kennedy found that this principle 
was not violated by the first-time felon’s life sentence for drug possession.90 
By contrast, the four dissenting Justices in Harmelin stood united in 
concluding that the Eighth Amendment bars disproportional prison 
sentences.91  Disputing the conclusions of Justice Scalia’s originalist analysis, 
they advanced historical evidence that the original meaning of “cruel and 
unusual punishments” either encompassed a review of disproportional prison 
sentences or did not prohibit it.92  The dissenters further stressed that the 
Eighth Amendment’s language is ambiguous93 and that the Court had 
recognized that the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishments” depends on 
the “‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.’”94  Drawing upon stare decisis, the four Justices concluded that the 
plurality had failed to provide a reasonable basis to depart from the 
proportionality standard established in Solem.95 
The Harmelin plurality’s narrow conception of prisoners’ rights proved 
controversial.96  Tellingly, the Michigan Supreme Court distanced itself from 
it the following year.97  Even though the U.S. Supreme Court had found no 
Eighth Amendment violation with the sentence that the Michigan defendant 
had received in Harmelin, the Michigan Supreme Court emphasized that 
Harmelin “is only persuasive authority for purposes of this Court’s 
interpretation and application of the Michigan Constitution,” and that 
“we may in some cases find more persuasive, and choose to rely upon, the 
reasoning of the dissenting justices of [the United States Supreme Court].”98  
The Michigan Supreme Court accordingly held that mandatory life without 
parole was a disproportionately harsh punishment for cocaine possession 
 
 89 Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 90 Id. at 1009. 
 91 Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens formally joined Justice Byron White’s 
dissenting opinion. See id. (White, J., dissenting). Justice Thurgood Marshall filed a separate 
dissent, stating, “I agree with Justice White’s dissenting opinion, except insofar as it asserts 
that the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not proscribe the 
death penalty.” Id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall had formerly concluded that 
the death penalty inherently violates the Eighth Amendment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 92 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009–12 (White, J., dissenting). 
 93 Id. at 1011. 
 94 Id. at 1015 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 95 Id. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting). 
 96 See generally Nilsen, supra note 31, at 113, 148, 169. 
 97 People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 875 (Mich. 1992); see also Nilsen, supra note 31, 
at 165 n.262 (discussing Bullock and Michigan state reform efforts following Harmelin). 
 98 Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 870. 
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under the Michigan Constitution.99  Harmelin may nonetheless be the most 
significant precedent regarding the intersection of mass incarceration and 
constitutional law.  Despite being a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court and 
lower courts proved highly deferential to its rationale that a prison sentence 
need not be remotely proportional to culpability to pass muster under the 
Eighth Amendment.100 
Placed in a wider societal context, Harmelin epitomized the 
contemporary American zeitgeist.  By giving prisoners facing ruthless 
sentences no constitutional recourse, Harmelin’s reasoning paralleled the 
mercilessness characterizing American justice in this historical period.  
Among other developments, “broken windows” policing advocated “zero 
tolerance” against petty offenders,101 and legislative reforms provided for 
lengthy mandatory stays in prison, if not permanent incapacitation, 
regardless of mitigating circumstances.102 
As mass incarceration reached historic levels, the Supreme Court heard 
more challenges to extreme sentences.  In 2003, in Ewing v. California, 
another plurality found no constitutional violation by a sentence of twenty-
five-years-to-life imposed on a man who had shoplifted golf clubs worth 
approximately $1,200—his “third strike” under California law.103  The Ewing 
plurality comprised of Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Rehnquist followed 
Kennedy’s Harmelin concurrence by concluding that the Eighth Amendment 
“forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the 
crime.”104  The Ewing plurality additionally reasoned that three strikes laws 
aim to punish, deter or incapacitate career criminals, thereby reflecting “a 
rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference.”105  Justices Scalia and 
 
 99 Id. at 877. Moreover, “[i]n 1998, the Michigan legislature moved to an optional rather 
than a mandatory life sentence and, in 2002, raised the triggering quantity from 650 to 1000 
grams.” Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Comment, The Inadequacy of Fiscal Constraints as a 
Substitute for Proportionality Review, 114 YALE L.J. 1177, 1180 n.18 (2005). 
 100 Barkow, supra note 31, at 49–50; Nilsen, supra note 31, at 113, 148, 169. 
 101 See generally LOÏC WACQUANT, PRISONS OF POVERTY 14–18 (2009). 
 102 See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND 
DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 4–7, 17 (2001) (describing the 
roots of the three strikes legislation that California adopted in 1994, which was a mandatory 
version of preexisting laws on the incarceration of recidivists); Kate Stith & Steve Koh, The 
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227–28, 231, 285–86 (1993) (explaining the emergence of 
federal sentencing guidelines requiring harsh mandatory minimum stays in prison). 
 103 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 104 Id. at 23 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 105 Id. at 24–28, 30.  
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Thomas concurred in the judgment but asserted that the Eighth Amendment 
lacks any proportionality principle at all.106 
In Lockyer v. Andrade, a habeas corpus case decided on the same day 
as Ewing, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment likewise offered no 
protection to Leandro Andrade, a petty, nonviolent recidivist who received a 
fifty-year-to-life sentence under California’s three strikes statute after 
shoplifting videotapes worth $153.107  Compared to Ewing, who had 
previously been convicted of robbery at knifepoint,108 Andrade had a minor 
criminal record consisting of convictions for theft, burglary, and marijuana 
transportation.109  That did not change the equation.  Writing for a 5-4 
majority, Justice O’Connor reasoned that “[t]he gross disproportionality 
principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary 
case.”110  Andrade, then thirty-seven years old,111 was thus condemned to die 
in prison for stealing videotapes.  The dissenting Justices declared that “[i]f 
Andrade’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no 
meaning.”112 
Leandro Andrade’s fate can also be understood in the context of the 
American zeitgeist.  By effectively negating the value of Andrade’s life, the 
Supreme Court and California authorities seemed to adopt the ideology of 
the so-called “victims’ rights” movement.  The movement has commonly 
reflected a “zero-sum” mindset perceiving any concern for prisoners’ rights, 
well-being, or rehabilitation as being, anti-victim, unlike restorative justice 
models.113  While the movement’s role in capital cases has received 
significant attention,114 its logic extended to other areas of American 
sentencing.115  Tending to victims or caring about the public meant that 
 
 106 Id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
 107 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 63 (2003). 
 108 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18–19. 
 109 Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66–67. 
 110 Id. at 77. 
 111 Id. at 79 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 112 Id. at 83. 
 113 See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 4, at 143; Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for 
Equal Rites?: Victim Allocution, Defendant Allocution, and the Crime Victims Rights’ Act, 26 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 439–40 (2008). 
 114 See generally CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 211 (2016) (noting that the victims’ rights 
movement had significant influence over capital punishment in the 1980s and 1990s, although 
since then it has been rivaled by new, anti-death penalty victims’ groups). 
 115 Procedurally, the victims’ rights movement has often focused on having judges 
consider victim impact statements at sentencing. On a broader level, the movement has 
minimized prisoners’ rights by equating justice for victims almost exclusively with retribution 
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offenders must be treated harshly.  By ironically framing dehumanizing 
justice as the embodiment of compassion, the victims’ rights movement 
exemplified the peculiarities of American law.  The fundamental ethos of 
justice in the United States appeared to be unmistakable punitiveness, as 
illustrated by the proliferation of revealing mottos: “tough on crime,” “zero 
tolerance,” “you do the crime, you do the time,” “an eye for an eye,” and 
“just deserts.”116 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court made the Eighth Amendment the most 
irrelevant when it was the most needed.  In 1994, the U.S. prison population 
topped the one million mark for the first time in history.117 In 2002, it reached 
two million prisoners.118  As the Supreme Court countenanced extreme 
punishments with no equivalent in the Western world, the extraordinary 
divergence of American justice seemed undeniable. 
However, one of the Justices, who had reasoned that the Eighth 
Amendment barely protects defendants from ruthless prison terms, 
eventually showed growing concern about the human toll of prison 
population explosion.  Justice Anthony Kennedy denounced mass 
incarceration in a 2003 speech at the American Bar Association (ABA).119  
Noting that “countries such as England, Italy, France and Germany” have a 
drastically lower incarceration rate than the United States, Kennedy 
emphatically called for legislative reform: “It is a grave mistake to retain a 
policy just because a court finds it constitutional . . . . A court decision does 
not excuse the political branches or the public from the responsibility for 
unjust laws.”120  Kennedy’s remarks suggested a realization that mass 
 
and incapacitation, rather than rehabilitation and alternatives to incarceration. The movement 
developed nationwide and grew influential in diverse types of cases. See, e.g., GARLAND, 
supra note 4, at 143, 159, 169; Giannini, supra note 113, at 439–40; Kristin Henning, What’s 
Wrong With Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court: Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems of 
Justice, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1107 (2009). But see Giannini, supra note 113, at 473 (“[T]here are 
circumstances at sentencing where victims express statements of mercy, forgiveness, or hope 
for the defendant’s rehabilitation.”). 
 116 See generally JOUET, supra note 4, at 203. 
 117 U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1994 (1995), https://bjs.gov/content
/pub/pdf/Pi94.pdf [https://perma.cc/37RF-26W6]; see also Pierre Thomas, U.S. Prison 
Population, Continuing Rapid Growth Since 80s, Surpasses 1 Million, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 
1994, at A3. 
 118 U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2002 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/p02.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F3D-LZRK]; see also Fox Butterfield, Prison 
Rates Among Blacks Reach a Peak, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003. 
 119 Anthony Kennedy, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address at the American 
Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/viewspeech/sp_08-09-03 [https://perma.cc/ZF3Y-LT2Z]. 
 120 Id. 
724 JOUET [Vol. 109 
incarceration may not reflect legitimate penological goals, as illustrated by 
his reference to James Whitman’s scholarly book Harsh Justice.121  
“Professor Whitman concludes that the goal of the American corrections 
system is to degrade and demean the prisoner,” Kennedy observed.122  “That 
is a grave and serious charge.  A purpose to degrade or demean individuals is 
not acceptable in a society founded on respect for the inalienable rights of the 
people.”123  Kennedy’s speech led to the creation of an ABA commission that 
bore his name and that was tasked with investigating solutions to mass 
incarceration.124  The Justice Kennedy Commission presented its 
recommendations to the ABA the following year.125  Given the relative 
absence of meaningful reform at either the state or federal level in the 
aftermath of his speech and the commission’s report, it is plausible that 
Kennedy came to see a greater role for the Eighth Amendment in addressing 
mass incarceration. 
Beginning in 2010, the Court expanded the Eighth Amendment’s scope 
in three juvenile cases: Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, and 
Montgomery v. Louisiana. Justice Kennedy not only was in the majority in 
all of these cases; he authored the Graham decision that departed from the 
rigid reasoning of his own influential plurality opinion in Harmelin by 
distinguishing it as follows: “The present case involves an issue the Court 
has not considered previously: a categorical challenge to a term-of-years 
sentence [i.e., life without parole for a juvenile in a nonmurder case].”126  
Kennedy also remarkably wrote: “The concept of proportionality is central 
to the Eighth Amendment.”127  Graham consequently held that life 
imprisonment without parole was “cruel and unusual punishment” for minors 
convicted of nonhomicide offenses.  The dissenters protested that the 
 
 121 Id.; see also WHITMAN, supra note 4. 
 122 Kennedy, Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting, supra note 119. 
 123 Id. 
 124 James Podgers, Prison Country: ABA to Study Issues Justice Kennedy Raised at 
Annual Meeting, 89 ABA JOURNAL 1, 87 (2003). 
 125 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION, REPORTS WITH 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Aug. 2004), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_
kennedy_JusticeKennedyCommissionReportsFinal.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/85Y
T-GCH4] [hereinafter “JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION REPORT”]. 
 126 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010); see also Barkow, supra note 31, at 49 
(discussing Graham’s historical significance as the first decision to depart from Harmelin’s 
logic). 
 127 Graham, 560 U.S. at 59 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) 
(alteration in original)). 
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majority had disregarded stare decisis and Harmelin’s “death is different” 
doctrine that limited proportionality review to capital cases.128 
Harmelin was again at issue in Miller, a subsequent challenge to life 
without parole for all juveniles.129  In the course of oral arguments, Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor asked Bryan Stevenson, the prominent human rights 
attorney who represented Evan Miller, “[H]ow do you deal with 
Harmelin . . . if Harmelin says we don’t look at individualized 
sentencing?”130 Stevenson tellingly responded, “It’s a challenge, and I 
concede that,” before suggesting that the Court follow the Graham 
standard.131  As Harmelin would indeed have posed an obstacle to the 
juvenile’s claim, John C. Neiman, Jr., who appeared on behalf of Alabama, 
urged the Court to follow that precedent during his oral argument: “Harmelin 
effectively sets a bright line here such [] that individualized sentencing is 
only required in [] a death penalty case.”132 
Justice Elena Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller ultimately dismissed 
as “myopic” the claim that Harmelin barred relief under the Eighth 
Amendment: “Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport 
to apply its holding to the sentencing of juvenile offenders. . . . [A] 
sentencing rule permissible for adults may not be so for children.”133  Miller 
held that life without parole could not be a mandatory sentence for a murder 
perpetrated by a juvenile.134  Four years later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
the Justices found that Miller had announced a substantive constitutional rule 
that should apply retroactively, opening the door for numerous juveniles 
serving mandatory life terms to seek resentencing.135 
Graham, Miller, and Montgomery were partly the fruit of the Court’s 
abolition of the juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons, a 2005 
precedent.136  Roper was itself predicated on Atkins v. Virginia, a 2003 
decision abolishing the death penalty for the “mentally retarded.”137  Atkins 
and Roper both held that capital punishment should be reserved for the most 
culpable offenders, a category excluding juveniles and the mentally disabled.  
 
 128 Id. at 99–100, 103–05 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 129 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 130 Oral Argument at 8:51, Miller, 567 U.S. 460. (No. 10-9646), https://www.oyez.org/
cases/2011/10-9646 [https://perma.cc/AL37-XLHJ]. 
 131 Id.  
 132 Id. at 38:30. 
 133 Miller, 567 U.S. at 481. 
 134 Id. at 489. 
 135 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 (2016). 
 136 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551 (2005). 
 137 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304 (2002). 
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Atkins and Roper initially appeared to confirm the enduring principle that the 
death penalty is the only type of punishment that must be proportional to 
culpability under the Eighth Amendment, as death is “qualitatively” different 
from incarceration.138 
Nevertheless, in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery the Court analogized 
life without parole to the death penalty given that both punishments condemn 
people to death behind bars.139  Citing neurological and behavioral science 
demonstrating that teenagers’ brains are not fully developed, the Court 
reasoned that the diminished decision-making ability of juveniles mitigates 
their culpability.140  In Graham and its progeny, “death is different” may thus 
have given way to a new principle: “juveniles are different.” 
Yet a broader evolution suggests that a paradigm shift in American 
society may not be narrowly limited to juveniles’ rights.  Alongside state 
sentencing reforms and a rising social debate about ending mass 
incarceration,141 the Supreme Court appears increasingly concerned about 
dignitary harms in the penal system.142  In particular, beside the Graham and 
Montgomery decisions, Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in 
Brown v. Plata concluding that abusive conditions of incarceration violate 
“human dignity.” 143  This pattern seemed to confirm Kennedy’s concern 
about the tension between human dignity and harsh prison sentences, which 
 
 138 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995–96 (1991) (plurality opinion). In practice, 
“death is different” has not been synonymous with a thorough review of each death row 
prisoner’s culpability and mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court and lower appellate 
courts have been disinclined to overturn death sentences, instead deferring to state authorities’ 
efforts to impose capital punishment. See DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: 
AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 267 (2010) (describing how in the mid-
1990s “the Court made it clear that it would no longer examine case-specific proportionality, 
review capital sentencing patterns for evidence of disparity, nor require state appellate courts 
to conduct comparative proportionality review”). 
 139 See generally Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 474–75 (2012). 
 140 See generally id. at 471–73; Steinberg, supra note 15, at 513. 
 141 See infra Section III. 
 142 Dignity has gained importance in other areas of constitutional law. See Leslie Meltzer 
Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 PENN. L. REV. 169, 169 (2011); e.g., Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (emphasizing that same-sex marriage is a constitutional 
right required by “equal dignity in the eyes of the law”); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 
744, 771 (2013) (finding that the Defense of Marriage Act “interfere[s] with the equal dignity 
of same-sex marriages”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 574, 575 (2003) (holding 
that criminalizing intimate homosexual relations is an affront to “dignity”); Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(reasoning that abortion is a constitutional right, under certain conditions, partly because it 
reflects “choices central to dignity and personal autonomy”). 
 143 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011). 
2019] MASS INCARCERATION PARADIGM SHIFT 727 
he had signaled in his 2003 speech at the American Bar Association144 and 
his endorsement of the ABA commission on criminal justice reform.145  But 
Kennedy was not the lone conservative-leaning member of the Court willing 
to expand the Eighth Amendment’s scope.  Strikingly, Chief Justice John 
Roberts concurred with the judgment in Graham146 and was in the majority 
in Montgomery,147 although he dissented in Miller.148  These developments 
demonstrated that, notwithstanding the Court’s historic reluctance to enforce 
the Eighth Amendment, its interpretation is not set in stone.  Moreover, 
historical and comparative evidence suggests that the evolution of Western 
sensibilities extends far beyond the idiosyncrasies of individual Supreme 
Court Justices.149 
II. CONVERGENCE: AMERICAN PENAL PHILOSOPHY INCHES TOWARD 
HUMANITARIAN NORMS PREVALENT IN OTHER WESTERN 
DEMOCRACIES 
If mass incarceration in the United States long exemplified divergence, 
American justice may now be converging toward penal norms that have 
limited punitiveness in other Western democracies: dignity, proportionality, 
legitimacy, and rehabilitation.  Because the Supreme Court recognized these 
sentencing principles in its landmark juvenile decisions, few scholars have 
focused on how these principles are not age-dependent and could extend to 
adult prison cases.150  Indeed, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery have so far 
precipitated breakthroughs in juvenile justice reform—not adult criminal 
sentencing—in diverse states nationwide.151  Jonathan Simon is a notable 
exception in the academy, as he observed how Graham’s recognition of 
dignity principles may ultimately influence Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence and state laws concerning adults.152  But this development is 
unlikely to occur, unless the Justices and more experts take a broader view 
 
 144 Kennedy, supra note 119. 
 145 JUSTICE KENNEDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 125. 
 146 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 86 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment). 
 147 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016). 
 148 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 493 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 149 See infra notes 434–437 and accompanying text. 
 150 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 151 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 152 Simon, supra note 16, at 285–86; see also Berry, supra note 16, at 1109 (suggesting 
how courts could conceptualize an Eighth Amendment safeguard against life without parole 
for all prisoners in the aftermath of Graham); O’Hear, supra note 16, at 1138 (examining how 
the Justices’ “approach leaves room for lower courts to begin the process of extending Graham 
and Miller and developing principled limitations on the imposition of [life without parole] on 
adult offenders”). 
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of Graham and its progeny.  So far these cases have primarily been reduced 
to a narrow “juveniles are different” doctrine that effectively pits children 
against adults by suggesting that the former should be treated mercifully and 
the latter mercilessly.  From this angle, the Graham line of cases could 
cement and legitimize grossly excessive prison terms for adults, rather than 
challenge their constitutionality.  However, a closer reading of these 
decisions reveals significant parallels with sentencing principles that have 
protected both juveniles and adults from draconian prison terms in modern 
Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.153 
Scholarly research on international convergence in Eighth Amendment 
decisions has largely concentrated on a different matter: the Supreme Court’s 
citation of unratified international treaties and foreign law as persuasive 
authority.154  But the Justices did not simply conclude that inflicting certain 
ruthless punishments on juveniles violates international human rights 
standards.155  In this section, we will see that convergence has also been at 
the level of penal philosophy and has not been fully one-sided.  The European 
Court of Human Rights remarkably cited Graham as persuasive authority 
when prohibiting, for all persons, lifelong incarceration without the 
possibility of release in Europe.156 
Insofar as the Eighth Amendment is a microcosm of American penal 
philosophy, our analysis of its evolution will lay the groundwork to explore 
broader patterns of convergence in the next section.  Drawing upon the 
principles announced in Graham and its progeny, twenty-two states and the 
District of Columbia have abolished life without parole categorically for 
juveniles, granting them more rights than under the Eighth Amendment.157  
State actors have equally been debating whether to put an end to the mass 
incarceration era and its punitiveness.158  These developments may reflect a 
long-term trend in the Western world toward reducing the scope of offenders 
and offenses eligible for the harshest sentences.159 
 
 153 See generally JOUET, supra note 4, at 194–96, 218–21. 
 154 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Vinter, ¶ 73 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010)). 
 157 CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, States that Ban Life without Parole 
for Children, supra note 14; see also CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, 
RIGHTING WRONGS, supra note 13. 
 158 See infra Section III. 
 159 Id. 
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A. HUMAN DIGNITY 
Dignity has emerged as an increasingly influential constitutional 
principle in Europe,160 America,161 and beyond,162 although it has distant 
historical roots.163  While it is a multifaceted concept with competing 
definitions,164 one salient understanding of human dignity rests on the 
intrinsic worth of the person.165  As Neomi Rao describes, “the dignity that 
arises from one’s humanity is the most universal and open understanding of 
the term.  This dignity indicates that worth and regard arise in each individual 
simply by virtue of being human.”166  In Xavier Bioy’s analytical framework, 
the rising importance of dignity reflects a “hierarchisation of values” placing 
respect for the human person as the foremost consideration,167 thereby 
explaining why dignity is deemed inviolable and inalienable. 
Émile Durkheim, the French sociologist, observed over a century ago 
that the norm of dignity could attenuate the harshness of punishments by 
leading people to identify with offenders at a human level.168  Durkheim 
traced this development to the long-term societal evolution from pre-modern 
or authoritarian societies, such as absolute monarchies and theocracies, 
 
 160 See generally LA DIGNITÉ sAISIE PAR LES JUGES EN EUROPE (Laurence Burgorgue-
Larsen ed., 2010). 
 161 Henry, supra note 142, at 169 (presenting historical and empirical evidence of the 
Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on the principle of dignity). 
 162 See Luís Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in 
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 331 
(2012) (describing the growing weight of dignity as a principle in international courts, 
domestic courts in Western democracies, including the United States, as well as the legal 
systems of developing nations). 
 163 See generally Xavier Bioy, Le concept de dignité, in LA DIGNITÉ SAISIE PAR LES JUGES 
EN EUROPE 13, supra note 160, at 26–32 (describing the historical origins of dignity, from 
Antiquity to the Middle Ages and modern times); Simon, supra note 16, at 287 (discussing 
the diverse roots of dignity in Enlightenment philosophy, Greco-Roman antiquity, and 
Abrahamic religious traditions). 
 164 See generally GEORGE KATEB, HUMAN DIGNITY ix (2011) (acknowledging the 
difficulty in defining the concept of dignity); Henry, supra note 142, at 169 (2011) (noting 
that the principle of dignity is invoked by both liberal and conservative Supreme Court 
Justices); Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 183 (2011) (describing conflicting definitions of dignity). 
 165 See, e.g., KATEB, supra note 164, at ix; Bioy, supra note 163, at 24–33; Laurence 
Burgorgue-Larsen, La dignité dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme, in LA DIGNITÉ SAISIE PAR LES JUGES EN EUROPE 55, supra note 160, at 57; Simon, 
supra note 16, at 287–88; Rao, supra note 164, at 196. 
 166 Rao, supra note 164, at 196. 
 167 Bioy, supra note 163, at 24 (author’s translation). 
 168 Durkheim, supra note 26, at 65. 
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toward secularized liberal democracies.169  Under Durkheim’s theory, the 
bulk of offenses in pre-modern or authoritarian regimes are considered 
affronts to God, the monarch or society itself.170  Liberal democracies are 
founded on different premises that lead them to mainly penalize offenses 
perpetrated against individuals.171  This societal shift toward 
individualization was not limited to victimhood, but also encompassed 
greater empathy toward the individual offender.  As Durkheim described (in 
dated yet prescient language), in a liberal democracy “[w]hat concerns man 
concerns us all; because we are all men.  The feelings protecting human 
dignity thus are personally dear to us.”172  From this perspective, valuing the 
lives of both the victim and offender is not mutually exclusive, as it would 
be “a contradiction to avenge the human dignity violated in the person of the 
victim, by violating it in the person of the culprit.”173 
Durkheim’s theory of dignity, announced in 1900, finds support in 
growing reservations toward punishments that simply negate the value of 
prisoners’ lives.174  Two-thirds of all countries worldwide have abolished 
capital punishment in law or practice, a steady reformist trend since the early 
twentieth century.175  Even though this shift has various underlying causes, 
such as the geopolitical influence of European countries that made abolition 
a cornerstone of their foreign policy,176 it partly reflects an evolution in 
Western sensibilities.  With the exception of the United States, all modern 
Western democracies—European nations, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand—have abolished the death penalty and identify it as an inherent 
human rights violation.177  In their view, killing incapacitated prisoners who 
 
 169 See generally id. 
 170 Id. at 74–77, 87, 91–95. 
 171 Id. at 81, 86, 91–95. 
 172 Id. at 88 (author’s translation). 
 173 Id. at 90. 
 174 Michel Foucault called into question Durkheim’s theory by arguing that criminal 
punishments actually evolve toward insidious forms of social control that are not synonymous 
with valuing prisoners’ lives. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR 31 (Gallimard ed. 
2010) (1975). For a discussion of Foucault’s theory, see infra note 432 and accompanying 
text. 
 175 See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 42 
(2017); DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., ABOLITIONIST AND RETENTIONIST COUNTRIES, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries?scid=30&amp;did=140 [https://
perma.cc/PQ2H-RCZR] (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 176 Western European nations notably convinced former Soviet bloc nations to abolish the 
death penalty as a condition of entry into the Council of Europe and European Union. See 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 36–37 
(2003). 
 177 JOUET, supra note 4, at 218–24; ZIMRING, supra note 176, at 27, 39, 46–47. 
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could be imprisoned is an affront to human dignity.178  They normally refuse 
to extradite arrestees to countries retaining the death penalty, including 
America, unless they receive assurances that extraditees will not face 
execution.179  Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights forbids its 
forty-seven member states to conduct any extradition that may lead to the 
death penalty.180 
Besides the decline in capital punishment, growing reservations toward 
life sentences or imprisonment per se appear consistent with Durkheim’s 
theory.  Europe has gone the farthest in the West in refraining from 
condemning prisoners to die or spend decades behind bars.181  And when 
European offenders do face life imprisonment, their sentences typically have 
a realistic possibility of parole or executive pardon.182  As early as 1977, the 
German Constitutional Court illustratively barred mandatory life sentences 
because that punishment “strikes at the very heart of human 
dignity . . . without regard to the development of [the prisoner’s] 
personality.”183  This relative consensus culminated in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ 2013 Vinter decision, which held by a 16-1 vote that member 
 
 178 Id. 
 179 France notably refused to provide legal assistance to U.S. authorities seeking the death 
penalty against Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen involved in the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. ZIMRING, supra note 176, at 42–45; see also United States v. Burns, 
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 284–85 (Can.) (Canada Supreme Court decision refusing to extradite 
suspects to the United States if they could be executed); Robert Harvie & Hamar Foster, 
Shocks and Balances: United States v. Burns, Fine-Tuning Canadian Extradition Law and the 
Future of the Death Penalty, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 293 (2004); John Kifner, France Will Not 
Extradite If Death Penalty Is Possible, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2001, at B4 (describing France’s 
refusal to extradite American accused of murdering an abortion doctor, unless U.S. authorities 
guaranteed he would not face capital punishment). 
 180 Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 
120, 123 (2010) (reasoning that the death penalty inherently violates the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ right to life and right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading 
punishments, thereby precluding member states from extraditing any prisoner who may face 
the death penalty); Al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 456, 576–79, 598 
(2015) (concluding that Poland violated the European Convention on Human Rights by 
transferring to American authorities a member of Al Qaeda who may be executed by the 
United States). 
 181 Simon, supra note 16, at 285. For instance, life without parole has not garnered 
substantial judicial attention in Australia, unlike in Europe. See Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Life Without 
Parole in Australia, in LIFE IMPRISONMENT: A GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS 75, 76 (Dirk 
van Zyl Smit & Catherine Appleton eds., 2019). 
 182 Vinter, ¶ 68; Simon, supra note 16, at 285 (both discussing the state of the law in 
European nations). 
 183 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [German Constitutional Court] June 21, 1977, 45 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 187, 245 (F.R.G.), quoted in 
Nilsen, supra note 31, at 164. 
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states cannot sentence prisoners to lifelong incarceration without a genuine 
possibility of release.184  The Judges quasi-unanimously found that such a 
punishment was dehumanizing, running afoul of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights:185 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”186 
Reservations toward lifelong imprisonment are not limited to Europe, 
as they appear to reflect a broader evolution in the Western world.  In Canada, 
the longest sentence one may receive for first-degree murder is life with the 
possibility of parole after twenty-five years,187 but it can be imposed 
consecutively for multiple homicides following a 2011 reform intended to 
“toughen” Canadian justice, such as by leading to seventy-five years before 
eligibility for parole for a triple homicide.188  Nevertheless, these cases are 
rare189 and the Canadian penal system does not routinely apply very lengthy 
prison terms.190  Canada’s incarceration rate has remained rather steady since 
the 1950s191 and is nearly one-sixth that of the United States.192  Mass 
incarceration also does not exist in Australia and New Zealand, although 
local “tough on crime” movements have had a greater impact than in Canada 
 
 184 Vinter, ¶¶ 119–22, 139. 
 185 Id. 
 186 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 
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 189 Pester, supra note 188. 
 190 See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Weathering the Storm? Testing Long-
Standing Canadian Sentencing Policy in the Twenty-First Century, 45 CRIME & JUST. 359, 
379–81 (2016) [hereinafter “Weathering the Storm?”]; Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie 
Webster, Countering Punitiveness: Understanding Stability in Canada’s Imprisonment Rate, 
40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 325, 330-32 (2006); Cheryl Marie Webster & Anthony N. Doob, 
Punitive Trends and Stable Imprisonment Rates in Canada, 36 CRIME & JUST. 297, 307-11 
(2007). 
 191 Doob & Webster, Weathering the Storm?, supra note 190, at 361 fig. 1; see also 
WORLD PRISON BRIEF, CANADA, http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/canada [https://perma
.cc/ZH9Y-9EAY] (last visited Jan. 10, 2018). 
 192 See generally WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 39. 
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in expanding these nations’ prison populations.193  Still, Australia and New 
Zealand’s incarceration rates are over three times lower than in America.194  
Australia permits life without parole,195 yet data suggest that authorities apply 
this punishment far more sparingly than in the United States.196  In 2010, 
New Zealand adopted three strikes legislation encompassing life without 
parole for certain homicides, but in 2016 its Court of Appeal upheld a major 
challenge to the statute’s application in two high-profile murder cases.197  The 
Court emphasized that the provision of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
barring excessive prison terms lists them “alongside torture, cruelty and 
conduct with degrading effect”,198 and that lengthy incarceration must satisfy 
the Act’s additional provision protecting “the inherent dignity of the 
person.”199 
In contrast, life without parole is an ordinary facet of contemporary 
American justice.  The number of prisoners receiving this punishment has 
grown exponentially to approximately 50,000 people, a record level in U.S. 
history.200  Life without parole may appear relatively atypical considering 
that the United States has 2.1 million prisoners,201 but it is the tip of the 
iceberg in a penal system where dehumanizing punishments have become 
normalized.202 
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However, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the protection of 
human dignity is a guiding principle to interpret the Eighth Amendment.203  
While the Justices have often been disinclined to apply this principle, they 
have proved increasingly able to recognize human dignity in juveniles. In 
1989, during the same time period as when it summarily affirmed the 
constitutionality of extreme prison terms,204 the Court held by a 5-4 vote that 
it was constitutional to execute teenage offenders.205  Conversely, its 2005 
majority opinion abolishing the juvenile death penalty in Roper underscored 
that “[b]y protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth 
Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all 
persons.”206  The Justices added that the purpose of the United States 
Constitution was “to secure individual freedom and preserve human 
dignity.”207  Although Graham, Miller, and Montgomery did not specifically 
use the term “dignity,” these decisions restricting the applicability of life 
without parole are also premised on the intrinsic worth of children’s lives.  In 
all of these cases, the Court described the defendants’ personal backgrounds 
and mitigating circumstances to demonstrate that lower courts had 
discounted these aspects of their humanity when sentencing them to die in 
prison.208 
Yet human dignity is not an age-dependent principle.  A person cannot 
forfeit his or her dignity by turning eighteen years old and entering adulthood, 
as dignity is rooted in the inherent worth of a human being.209  The norm of 
dignity that seemed to influence the Court’s reasoning in juvenile cases may 
therefore be logically extended to those of adult prisoners.  Jonathan Simon 
has notably posited that the Court’s juvenile decisions may have broader 
implications in developing “dignity as a value in our public law.”210  
Acknowledging that “[t]he road from Graham to any eventual abolition of 
[life without parole] may be a long one,” Simon advanced that this paradigm 
shift may depend on “the ability of criminal justice officials, criminologists, 
 
 203 The Justices announced this standard in Trop, an influential 1958 decision. Trop v. 
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and lawyers to promote a commitment to dignity within penality itself.”211  
Other scholars have similarly suggested that enhancing the value of dignity 
in American justice may be a necessary step to move away from unduly harsh 
punishments.212 
B. PROPORTIONALITY OF PUNISHMENT TO CULPABILITY 
A court can hardly assess whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual” 
in the abstract and without any frame of reference.  Proportionality has 
historically been a key consideration in theories of punishment examining 
whether a given sentence fits the crime.213  Under these circumstances, 
eviscerating the principle of proportionality from the Eighth Amendment 
amounts to practically removing the amendment from the Constitution.  It is 
no coincidence that the Eighth Amendment became a dead letter for prisoners 
precisely during the three decades when the Supreme Court reasoned that no 
proportionality requirement effectively exists except in capital cases.214  In 
all likelihood, the Court would have rejected the juveniles’ claims in Graham, 
Miller, and Montgomery if it had not circumvented the “death is different” 
doctrine and reinvigorated the proportionality principle that it had last 
applied in Solem back in 1983.215 
Meanwhile, proportionality has been among the factors that have 
checked excessive punishments in Europe, as France’s case exemplifies.  
French politicians have clashed over whether the national penal system 
should emphasize repression or rehabilitation.216  Nicolas Sarkozy notably 
cast himself as a law and order conservative.217  Under his oversight as 
Minister of the Interior and then President, “[t]he rate of imprisonment rose 
from 79.2 per 100,000 inhabitants to 99.2” from 2002 to 2012.218  As of 2018, 
the French incarceration rate was still approximately 104 per 100,000 
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inhabitants.219  Despite these fluctuations, France’s penal system has 
remained very moderate compared to the United States, whose incarceration 
rate is over six times higher.220  The number of life sentences (with the 
possibility of parole) imposed in France per year also remained steady under 
Sarkozy’s tenure.221  The difference between America and France reflects 
multiple factors, ranging from distinct historical circumstances222 to a more 
centrist conception of conservatism in modern-day Europe.223  But a much 
greater commitment to proportionality in French sentencing is part of the 
equation.  The French Constitutional Court recognized in 2005 that 
individualized punishment is enshrined in the nation’s constitutional 
values.224  Moreover, a vast segment of French politicians and legal 
practitioners, including prosecutors and judges, have long embraced the 
substantive analysis of an offender’s individual mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances so that the sentence fits the crime.225 
Similarly, proportionality in punishment has remained a core principle 
in Canada, notwithstanding an influential “tough on crime” reform 
movement.  Under Prime Minister Stephen Harper of the Conservative Party, 
which governed Canada from 2006 to 2015, punitiveness became a central 
aspect of political rhetoric.226  Canada further adopted legislation instituting 
relatively harsh mandatory minimum sentences or restrictions on parole.227  
Nevertheless, Canada’s incarceration rate did not increase significantly, 
partly because judges and other legal actors were skeptical of this punitive 
streak and resisted efforts to abandon individual sentencing.228  As in France 
under President Sarkozy,229 assessing aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances to apply a punishment proportional to culpability remained a 
key value in Canada’s penal system.  Comparably, in a seminal decision 
concerning two prominent murder cases, the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
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held that applying life without parole under a recently enacted three-strikes 
statute would be excessive given the defendants’ individual circumstances 
(age, mental health, actions, etc.),230 and may violate the national Bill of 
Rights Act’s ban on “disproportionately severe treatment or punishment.”231 
This is a far cry from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Harmelin line of cases, 
which rejected such substantive analysis and ratified the summary infliction 
of blatantly disproportional sentences like lifelong incarceration for petty 
recidivists.232  It must be noted that these decisions’ rejection of 
proportionality review scarcely stem from an innately distinct conception of 
constitutionalism in the United States next to France, Canada, and other 
Western nations.  One should be wary of essentialism when analyzing the 
evolution of American penal norms, which can reflect human agency and 
historical contingency.233  Indeed, the Eighth Amendment has encompassed 
a proportionality principle in other contexts for decades—a double standard 
suggesting a choice by certain Justices to exclude prison sentences from 
review.  As Justice White’s dissent in Harmelin observed, “Justice Scalia’s 
position that the Eighth Amendment addresses only modes or methods of 
punishment is quite inconsistent with our capital punishment cases, which do 
not outlaw death as a mode or method of punishment, but instead put limits 
on its application.”234  Justice Souter added that it would be “anomalous” to 
“suggest that the [text of the] Eighth Amendment makes proportionality 
review applicable in the context of bail and fines but not in the context of 
other forms of punishment, such as imprisonment.”235 
The Court eventually chose to apply proportionality review to life 
without parole in juvenile cases.236  But it did so using broad language: “The 
concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.  Embodied in 
the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the ‘precept of 
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to 
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[the] offense.’”237  Additionally, the Court distanced itself from Harmelin’s 
unpersuasive “death is different” doctrine by analogizing life without parole 
to the death penalty since both condemn people to die in prison.238  These 
developments suggest relative convergence with other Western democracies, 
where the proportionality of punishment is an influential norm.239 
Going forward, it would be incoherent for the U.S. Supreme Court to 
strictly limit proportionality review to juvenile cases, as this principle does 
not become irrelevant the moment when people turn eighteen.  Because youth 
is a mitigating circumstance, a sentence imposed on an adult may reasonably 
be longer than for an adolescent convicted of the same crime, yet that 
sentence must still fit the crime.  In the absence of a proportionality principle 
applying to adult prisoners, their sentences may continue to dramatically 
exceed culpability.  Alongside life without parole, mass incarceration has led 
to the normalization of “virtual life” sentences, namely, prison terms that 
stretch far beyond the convicted person’s life expectancy.240  Certain courts 
have thus inflicted sentences spanning hundreds of years, as in the case of a 
defendant who received 290 years in prison for robberies that netted him 
approximately $3,000.241 
C. LEGITIMACY OF PENAL PURPOSE 
The Graham line of cases acknowledged a longstanding principle: harsh 
punishments that serve no legitimate penological purpose are suspect.  This 
principle is tied to the proportionality of punishment, yet adds another 
analytical dimension by assessing whether the state’s goal is to oppress the 
prisoner by inflicting ruthless treatment.  Cesare Beccaria, the Italian 
Enlightenment philosopher, prioritized this principle in his magnum opus On 
Crimes and Punishment, a trailblazing work in criminology that America’s 
Founding Fathers and other prominent thinkers read.242  “[E]very act of 
authority between one man and another that does not derive from absolute 
necessity is tyrannical,” Beccaria wrote, cautioning governments against 
resorting to excessive punishments.243 
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Despite influencing the likes of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, 
Thomas Paine, John Hancock, and Benjamin Rush,244 Beccaria’s principles 
may have had less concrete influence on the text of the Eighth Amendment245 
than on the law of another nation shaped by Enlightenment ideas: France.246  
In 1789, its revolutionaries inserted in their Declaration of Human Rights and 
of the Citizen an article stipulating that “[t]he Law must prescribe only the 
punishments that are strictly and evidently necessary,”247 echoing Beccaria’s 
definition of a legitimate punishment.248  Modern French law has adopted the 
1789 Declaration as part of its constitutional system.249  According to William 
Stuntz, the eminent American scholar, France’s Declaration has provided its 
democracy with more substantive criminal protections than the U.S. Bill of 
Rights, which primarily consists of procedural safeguards.250  Banning 
punishments that are not “strictly and evidently necessary” (or “strictly and 
obviously necessary,” depending on the translation) under the French 
Declaration entails more lenity than banning only “cruel and unusual 
punishments” under the Eighth Amendment.251  Stuntz concludes his 
comparison by stating that “American law knows nothing like these 
substantive limits on government power.”252  But does it? 
Stuntz’s conclusion appears to be an overstatement, as he himself noted 
that America had incarceration levels comparable to those of European 
nations until the 1970s.253  Lenity was not enshrined in the Eighth 
Amendment’s text as much as in the French Declaration, which advances that 
excessive punishments are illegitimate; yet Stuntz’s own magisterial study 
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reminds us that American justice often applied punishment “sparingly” prior 
to the mass incarceration era.254 
The understanding of a legitimate punishment in modern America and 
France differs partly because the U.S. penal system has grown more 
populistic.255  For instance, American judges and prosecutors are usually 
elected at the local level, although judicial elections are rare by international 
standards.256  While this institutional peculiarity long preceded the advent of 
mass incarceration,257 it enabled elected judges and prosecutors to campaign 
by supporting ultra-punitive policies after the “tough on crime” movement 
emerged in the 1970s.258  By contrast, French judges and prosecutors are 
trained civil servants, who are less receptive to political pressure and more 
driven by policy goals established in consultation with other national 
experts.259  The same can be said about other Western societies like Canada, 
where non-elected judges have resisted political pressure to sentence 
prisoners more harshly.260 
From a populist conception of democracy, the greater receptiveness of 
U.S. officials to public calls for harshness may appear more legitimate than 
legal systems where experts are mainly in charge.  Nevertheless, the 
American public may be less supportive of draconian punishments than it 
seems, as many U.S. citizens are ill-informed about criminal justice policy or 
are swayed by misleading fear-mongering.261 
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Furthermore, a draconian punishment is not constitutionally legitimate 
simply because it might be politically popular.  Michael Tonry has described 
how a factor behind the United States’ mass incarceration phenomenon has 
been extraordinary deference to “whatever punishments policy makers 
specified, whether or not those policies respected retributive principles or 
ideas about proportionality, and whether those policies were adopted for 
substantive reasons or to demonstrate politicians were tough on crime.”262  
But the Eighth Amendment cannot persuasively be reduced to the tautology 
that if the authorities or the public support a particular punishment, then it 
cannot be “cruel and unusual.”  If so, why have an Eighth Amendment? 
Rather, assessing the constitutional legitimacy of a punishment entails 
assessing its penological purpose.263 
This is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Graham, holding that 
“[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature 
disproportionate to the offense,”264 thereby inching toward the Beccarian 
legitimacy principle recognized in France.  Firstly, the Justices concluded 
that the traditional penal objective of deterrence has diminished weight in 
juvenile cases in light of neurological and behavioral science showing that 
juveniles are less capable than adults to grasp the consequences of their 
actions, leading to impetuous criminal behavior that cannot readily be 
deterred.265  Secondly, the traditional penal objective of retribution has 
diminished legitimacy in juvenile cases because it “relates to an offender’s 
blameworthiness,” which the “immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity” of 
youth tend to mitigate.266  Thirdly, permanent incapacitation is a 
constitutionally suspect objective given evidence that teenagers have 
significant potential for rehabilitation.267  Under these circumstances, the 
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Supreme Court reasoned that summarily inflicting life without parole on 
juveniles harmed them without a valid policy rationale.268 
While the penological objectives of deterrence, retribution, and 
incapacitation are more justifiable in adult cases than juvenile ones, they also 
cannot legitimately justify extreme punishments for adults, such as the fifty-
year-to-life sentence that Leandro Andrade received for shoplifting 
videotapes worth $153.269  Experts widely agree that “three strikes” laws and 
other draconian sentencing schemes primarily targeting adults are not 
reasonably tailored to deter crime.270  Empirical evidence indicates that far 
shorter sentences can achieve both general and specific deterrence.271  
Similarly, lengthy prison terms inflicted on adults routinely lack a reasonable 
relationship to moral culpability. 
Mirroring the views of experts, generations of Justices have found the 
principle of legitimacy relevant to the constitutionality of adults’ sentences.  
When the Supreme Court previously deemed for three decades that “the 
length of the sentence actually imposed [for a felony] is purely a matter of 
legislative prerogative,”272 dissenting Justices objected that a sentence that 
“makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment . . . is 
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and 
suffering.”273  For instance, Justice Souter’s dissent in Lockyer emphasized 
that a state cannot genuinely defend in the name of public safety a policy 
resulting in decades of incarceration for a nonviolent adult shoplifter.274  
Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent in Harmelin likewise concluded that no 
legitimate public policy justified a mandatory life without parole sentence for 
an adult with no prior felony record who had been convicted of cocaine 
possession, as a “sentence must rest on a rational determination that the 
punished ‘criminal conduct is so atrocious that society’s interest in deterrence 
and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of reform or 
rehabilitation of the perpetrator.’”275 
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The presumption of unconstitutionality against harsh practices lacking 
legitimate policy goals is not limited to criminal punishment.  This principle 
has equally shaped Supreme Court and state court decisions on gay rights.276  
In particular, moral objections to homosexuality, a driving factor behind laws 
banning same-sex marriages and civil unions,277 cannot legitimize 
discrimination.278  As the Justices concluded in Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
marriages of consenting same-sex adults “pose no risk of harm to themselves 
or third parties.”279  Banning same-sex marriages therefore serves no 
legitimate policy goal, but rather “demeans or stigmatizes” gay people.280 
By the same token, moral support for retribution cannot legitimize 
extreme punishments for either children or adults.  Justice Kennedy had 
acknowledged this concern in his 2003 speech at the American Bar 
Association, which suggested awareness that a social desire “to degrade and 
demean the prisoner” contributed to the gulf between American and 
European justice.281  His majority opinion in Graham ultimately echoed the 
perspective of former dissenting Justices, European jurists, and Beccaria 
when he recognized that a punishment must have a “legitimate penological 
justification.”282  Announcing a principle relevant to both juvenile and adult 
cases, Kennedy added that “[c]riminal punishment can have different goals, 
and choosing among them is within a legislature’s discretion . . . . It does not 
follow, however, that the purposes and effects of penal sanctions are 
irrelevant to the determination of Eighth Amendment restrictions.”283 
D. HOPE FOR REHABILITATION AND RELEASE 
In Dante’s Inferno, the entrance to hell is marked by an ominous 
warning: “Abandon every hope, all you who enter.”284 The narrator shudders, 
observing that “these words I see are cruel.”285 The hopelessness of modern 
American prisoners condemned to die behind bars concretely illustrates 
Dante’s age-old allegory. Certain inmates facing life without parole indicate 
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that they would prefer to be executed.286  While some lifers are resilient, acute 
psychological distress is an ordinary aspect of their bleak existence.287 
Modern European nations have been far more inclined than the United 
States to recognize the severe hardship of lifelong incarceration.  In 1977, for 
example, the German Constitutional Court held that the government violates 
a prisoner’s fundamental rights if it “strips him of all hope of ever earning 
his freedom.”288  The French Constitutional Court similarly declared, in 
1994, that incarceration must aim “not only to protect society and ensure the 
punishment of the condemned, but also to facilitate his rehabilitation and 
prepare his eventual reentry into society.”289  For decades, most European 
democracies avoided condemning prisoners to die without any hope of 
release.290  Additionally, certain nations barred life sentences per se, such as 
Spain, where the longest possible sentence is forty years in prison.291 
The European Court of Human Rights’ 2013 decision in Vinter finally 
held that no member state could condemn people to hopelessly die behind 
bars.292  The case involved persons sentenced to life imprisonment for murder 
in England and Wales.293  They could only have been eligible for release if 
they had become “terminally ill or physically incapacitated,” among other 
stringent criteria.294  The European Judges deemed that these “highly 
restrictive conditions” barely “could really be considered release at all, if all 
it meant was that a prisoner died at home or in a hospice rather than behind 
prison walls.”295  After reviewing the state of international law and the 
practices of multiple nations, the Judges concluded that imprisonment 
without a genuine possibility of release is a fundamental human rights 
 
 286 Jessica S. Henry, Death-in-Prison Sentences, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 16, 
at 66, 74–75. 
 287 Marie Gottschalk, No Way Out?, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 16, at 227, 234; 
Paul H. Robinson, Life without Parole under Modern Theories of Punishment, in LIFE 
WITHOUT PAROLE, supra note 16,  at 138, 157. 
 288 BVerfG June 21, 1977, 45 BVerfGE 187, quoted in Nilsen, supra note 31, at 164. 
 289 Cons. Const. no. 93-334 DC, Jan. 20, 1994, ¶ 12. 
 290 Vinter, ¶ 68; Simon, supra note 16, at 285. 
 291 Vinter, ¶ 68 (discussing Spanish law). The longest possible sentence under Spanish 
law is forty years, yet it may amount to a de facto life sentence, depending on the age when 
the prisoner was convicted. See Carmen López Peregrín, La pena de prisión en España tras 
las reformas de 2003 y los fines de la pena (undated), https://www.upo.es/export/portal/com/
bin/portal/upo/profesores/mclopper/profesor/1213878047702_la_pena_de_prision_en_espax
a.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU3B-2C4U]. 
 292 Vinter, ¶ 189. 
 293 Id. ¶ 12. 
 294 Id. ¶ 126. 
 295 Id. ¶ 127. 
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violation.296  While the European Court effectively rejected the logic of 
permanent incapacitation that is commonplace in the United States, it 
strikingly cited Graham as persuasive authority.297  The citation was succinct, 
coming as part of a comprehensive survey of international and foreign law, 
but was significant in light of the tremendous divergence between the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Supreme Court’s penal 
philosophies in prior decades. 
Graham had explicitly held that thrusting the juvenile prisoner into a 
hopeless predicament was “cruel and unusual”: “The State has denied him 
any chance to [] demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society based solely on a 
nonhomicide crime that he committed while he was a child in the eyes of the 
law.  This the Eighth Amendment does not permit.”298  Such treatment 
“deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of 
restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility 
of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”299  The sentence 
simply offered “no hope” to Terrance Graham, “no matter what he might do 
to demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not 
representative of his true character, even if he spends the next half century 
attempting to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes.”300 
Hopelessness again was at issue during the oral arguments for Jackson 
v. Hobbs, a companion case to Miller that concerned life without parole for 
an Arkansas teenager convicted of felony murder. Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg told the Arkansas Assistant Attorney General, “[Y]ou’re dealing 
with a 14-year-old being sentenced to life in prison, so he will die in prison 
without any hope.”301  Justice Sonia Sotomayor pressed on this point by 
asking “What hope does he have?”302 The Assistant Attorney General 
claimed that the juvenile was not deprived of hope because he could apply 
for executive clemency.303  The Justices were unconvinced given the rarity of 
clemency in Arkansas, which Bryan Stevenson, the juvenile’s attorney, 
emphasized in his rebuttal.304 
 
 296 Id. ¶ 59–81. 
 297 Id. ¶ 73 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010)). 
 298 Graham, 560 U.S. at 79. 
 299 Id. at 69–70. 
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 301 Oral Argument (36:22), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. (2012), OYEZ (March 20, 2012), 
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 302 Id. at 37:30. 
 303 Id. at 37:57. 
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The Court’s ensuing decision in Miller did not bar life without parole 
categorically for juvenile homicides, although it found that it cannot be a 
mandatory sentence partly because that approach would “disregard[] the 
possibility of rehabilitation.”305  The Court later held in Montgomery that the 
aging petitioner had a constitutional right to seek resentencing because, after 
being mandatorily sentenced to life without parole as a juvenile, he had 
“spent each day of the past 46 years knowing he was condemned to die in 
prison.”306  In the Court’s view, such juvenile convicts “must be given the 
opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if 
it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be 
restored.”307 
On this point too, Justice Kennedy seemed to embrace the views of 
Justices who had dissented against his prior interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment.  Kennedy’s controlling opinion in Harmelin had given short 
shrift to the principle of rehabilitation, stressing that “the Eighth Amendment 
does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.”308  When 
reviewing the Graham sentence, however, he wrote that “[t]he penalty 
forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”309  This mirrored Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Harmelin, which underlined that sentencing an adult to 
mandatory life imprisonment without parole for cocaine possession “does not 
even purport to serve a rehabilitative function” and that it is “irrational” to 
assert that such adult offenders are “wholly incorrigible.”310 
The Lockyer dissenters reached the same conclusion, arguing that the 
nonviolent shoplifter’s sentence left him no hope of paying his debt to 
society: “[A]n 87-year-old man released after 50 years behind bars will have 
no real life left, if he survives to be released at all.”311  As the defendant had 
received consecutive twenty-five-year-to-life sentences, the dissenters 
concluded it was “irrational” to claim that, following his first lengthy 
sentence, the defendant still “would be so dangerous” that he would need to 
spend a second stretch of twenty-five years in prison before being eligible for 
parole.312 
 
 305 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 478 (2012). 
 306 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
 307 Id. at 736–37. 
 308 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J., 
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 309 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010). 
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Accordingly, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery advanced a principle 
with potentially profound ramifications: prison sentences inflicted on 
juveniles cannot negate the value of rehabilitation and possibility of release.  
As with dignity, proportionality, and legitimacy, the principle of 
rehabilitation is far from being solely relevant in juvenile cases.  Yesteryear 
the Supreme Court deemed that adolescents could be executed;313 it has now 
acknowledged that they are hardly irredeemable.314 It may eventually 
recognize that adult prisoners are not, either. 
E. AMERICAN PATH DEPENDENCE OR WESTERN CONVERGENCE? 
The Supreme Court went from holding for three decades that the Eighth 
Amendment has virtually nothing to say about draconian prison terms to 
recognizing key sentencing principles: dignity, proportionality, legitimacy, 
and rehabilitation.  Even though these principles are not age-dependent and 
resemble those that have made mass incarceration improbable in 
contemporary Western democracies, jurists have largely reduced Graham 
and its progeny to stepping stones toward reforming juvenile justice, thereby 
excluding adult prisoners.315  Before our final section presenting a broader 
theory on the evolution of American justice, it is worth considering why these 
landmark precedents may, at first glance, appear to only concern juveniles. 
First, practical reasons help explain why Graham, Miller, and 
Montgomery have been cabined into a narrow “juveniles are different” 
doctrine.  Eighth Amendment challenges to ruthless sentences inflicted on 
adult prisoners proved unsuccessful in Harmelin, Ewing, and Lockyer, 
despite garnering four dissenting votes in each case.316  Seeing a new opening 
following Roper’s abolition of the juvenile death penalty in 2005, opponents 
of mass incarceration switched gears by focusing on life without parole for 
juveniles.317  Litigators commonly seek narrowly-tailored remedies in an 
effort to persuade judges.  Additionally, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
 
 313 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by 
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sometimes moves incrementally in a particular direction, as gay rights 
illustrate.318  Litigators were therefore undoubtedly aware that they had a 
better chance to win test cases incrementally challenging life without parole 
for juveniles, rather than test cases challenging them for everyone again.319  
But their strategy effectively pitted children against adults, such as by 
drawing on behavioral and neurological science mitigating teenagers’ 
culpability.320  This pragmatic litigation tactic reinforced the notion that 
“juveniles are different,” a theme that state legislators later embraced to 
justify reforms abolishing life without parole for minors.321 
Second, cabining the aforesaid developments into a narrow “juveniles 
are different” doctrine may ironically reflect the normalization of harsh 
justice in America.  The doctrine could notably mean that children are not 
irredeemable, pitting them against incorrigible adults deserving merciless 
sentences—a zero-sum relationship.  This need not be the case.  One can 
imagine an interpretation of “juveniles are different” that would treat age as 
a mitigating circumstance under the Eighth Amendment, which would be 
compatible with applying the aforesaid sentencing principles—dignity, 
proportionality, legitimacy, rehabilitation—to adult prisoners.  Conversely, a 
rigid “juveniles are different” doctrine would create a strict age carve-out 
excluding adult prisoners from Eighth Amendment protection.  It is too early 
to tell which interpretation will prevail, although the latter would mean that 
it is not “cruel and unusual” to summarily lock up adults and “throw away 
the key.”  Naturally, that was not the intention of reformers like Bryan 
Stevenson, who litigated Miller and is an earnest opponent of mass 
 
 318 In Lawrence, the Court held that sexual relations between men could not be 
criminalized. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Lawrence was a stepping stone toward 
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constitutional right in Obergefell. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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 320 See appellate briefs, supra note 319. 
 321 See generally CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS, 
supra note 13, at 4; see also infra notes 392–396 and accompanying text. 
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incarceration.322  But reform efforts can sometimes backfire, as demonstrated 
by how certain death penalty opponents helped normalize life without parole 
by touting it as an alternative to executions.323  In other words, in a nation 
where scores of citizens have become inured to world-record incarceration 
levels,324 a “progressive” development like the Graham, Miller, and 
Montgomery decisions could be interpreted in a way that cements ruthless 
justice for adults, the truly “bad guys.”325  So far the efforts of children’s 
rights advocates have not backfired, as they have led the Justices toward non-
age-dependent Eighth Amendment principles.  If these developments 
ultimately prove fruitless for adult prisoners, it may be because of the notion 
that they could not conceivably stand for more than “juveniles are different.” 
Third, historiography helps explain why the academy has devoted 
limited attention to the relative convergence in penal philosophy between 
America and other Western democracies, namely European nations, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand.  Given the extraordinary magnitude of mass 
incarceration, scholarship in recent decades has understandably focused on 
explaining the harshness of American justice and its international divergence, 
especially from European norms.326  Moreover, considering the Court’s 
historic reticence to enforce the Eighth Amendment,327 as well as the fact that 
criminal justice is largely run at the state and local levels, scholars have 
justifiably grown skeptical about the Court’s capacity to meaningfully 
address mass incarceration.328 
 
 322 See BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 14, 16, 
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All three factors suggest that various forms of path dependence329 
obscured the developments identified above.  The first path dependence is 
predominantly shaped by litigators, the second by punitive mindsets, and the 
third by the scholarly tendency to focus on the peculiar harshness of modern 
American justice.  Insofar as path dependence drives history, one should not 
overestimate the significance of the Graham line of cases.  It is definitely 
possible, if not plausible, that the Court will decline to extend Eighth 
Amendment principles of dignity, proportionality, legitimacy, and 
rehabilitation to adult prisoners.  However, one should not underestimate 
these developments either.  Graham, Miller, and Montgomery might mark a 
transition toward broadening the constitutional safeguard against “cruel and 
unusual punishments,” which may have a ripple effect on state practices.  
Twenty-two states have notably abolished life without parole altogether for 
juveniles, partly by pointing to the Eighth Amendment’s expanding scope.330 
III. IMPERMANENCE: A COMPARATIVE THEORY ON THE EVOLUTION OF 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 
The paradigm shift in American penal philosophy described thus far 
may reflect a broader phenomenon with potential implications for the future 
of mass incarceration.  In this section, I propose a theory regarding the 
comparative evolution of criminal punishment to help understand these 
developments and how penal attitudes are impermanent social constructs.  
Just as certain elements suggest that mass incarceration has become 
profoundly ingrained in the United States, other elements suggest that it may 
not forever remain the face of American justice. 
This theory of impermanence revolves around two simultaneous 
patterns: cyclicality and steadiness of direction.  The patterns resemble a 
seismograph that regularly swings up or down despite moving steadily in a 
given direction.  On one hand, attitudes toward criminal punishment in 
America and beyond are cyclical, as they historically ebb and flow between 
repressive and humanitarian aspirations.  This may lead to periods of 
 
 329 While path dependence is a recurrent concept in social theory, James Mahoney has 
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divergence or convergence between countries.  Nowadays, after a period of 
considerable divergence due to an ultra-punitive phase in the United States, 
American penal philosophy may be inching toward principles that have 
checked draconian prison sentences in other Western democracies: dignity, 
proportionality, legitimacy, and rehabilitation.  On the other hand, we may 
be witnessing a long-term trend toward limiting or abolishing the harshest 
criminal punishments in the West.  A wider historical lens suggests that, 
paradoxically, the relative steadiness of this long-term trend may coexist with 
the unsteadiness of cyclical attitudes toward punishment. 
The magnitude of mass incarceration, combined with its peculiar 
historical and social roots,331 may lead observers to conclude that harsh 
justice is innately coded in the “American DNA.”  Evidence indicates 
otherwise.  While America’s state prisoner population exploded by over 
700% from the 1970s to the 2010s,332 its incarceration rate previously was 
comparable to those of other Western democracies.333  David Garland’s 
scholarship has instructively warned against essentialism when interpreting 
the U.S. penal system’s peculiarities.334  His conclusions about America’s 
retention of capital punishment in an age of growing global abolitionism 
appear applicable to mass incarceration: “Far from being the expression of 
an unchanging culture, the current American system is the outcome of 
historical events that unfolded within a distinctive set of institutional 
 
 331 For diverse theories about the origins of mass incarceration, see supra notes 4, 23 and 
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structures and social processes.”335  Like other dimensions of American 
exceptionalism,336 mass incarceration “is not set in stone”337 as it stems from 
particular social circumstances and human agency,338 ranging from the 
political climate to the nomination of new Justices following tightly 
contested presidential elections.339 
Insofar as penal systems are impermanent social constructs, the 
evolution of capital punishment may shed light on the evolution of draconian 
prison terms.  The path toward the abolition of the death penalty in Western 
democracies has historically been incremental, encompassing what Garland 
described as “a reduced range of capital offenses and eligible offenders,” a 
“decline in the frequency of executions,” and “the appearance of sharp 
divisions in public attitudes towards the penalty’s propriety.”340  This trend 
has occurred in the United States notwithstanding the fact that it is the lone 
Western democracy to retain capital punishment.  First, the Supreme Court 
has abolished the death penalty for certain categories of crimes and offenders.  
Murder and treason are essentially the sole remaining capital crimes,341 as the 
Court concluded that death is an excessive punishment for rape342 and most 
accomplices in felony murder cases.343  It is no longer constitutional to 
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execute juveniles344 and the “mentally retarded.”345  Second, the number of 
death sentences and executions has declined since the start of the twenty-first 
century;346 meanwhile, the number of abolitionist states has risen.347  Third, 
the death penalty has been a recurrent matter of controversy in American 
society.348  As Garland emphasizes, “[t]his trajectory of decline, with minor 
variations, occurred in the United States just as it did throughout the 
[W]estern world.”349  Under this framework, America could be seen as a 
laggard rather than a permanent exception when it comes to the death penalty. 
One may draw the hypothesis that this pattern mirrors the evolution of 
American law toward draconian prison terms.  First, the Supreme Court and 
state authorities have abolished life without parole for certain categories of 
crimes and offenders.  Following Graham, life without parole is no longer a 
constitutional punishment for a juvenile in a nonhomicide case.350  Under 
Miller, it is also unconstitutional to impose it mandatorily on a juvenile in a 
homicide case.351  And twenty-two states have concluded that life without 
parole should no longer apply in juvenile cases per se, thereby granting them 
more protections than under the Eighth Amendment.352  Second, various 
states have reduced their prison populations.353  A California ballot initiative 
illustratively scaled back the state’s merciless “three strikes” law.354  The 
Supreme Court additionally ordered California, in Brown v. Plata, to reduce 
prison overcrowding because “[a] prison that deprives prisoners of basic 
sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the 
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concept of human dignity.”355  That decision may have played a role in 
reducing California’s incarceration rate.356  Third, a social debate about the 
propriety of mass incarceration has emerged.357  The Supreme Court’s 
repeated refusal to find ruthless sentences “cruel and unusual” under the 
Eighth Amendment between 1983 and 2010 led to pushback from dissenting 
Justices, lower courts, and prominent experts.358  A relatively broad range of 
political leaders, media outlets, traditional civil society organizations, and 
activist groups have called for reform.359  A new wave of prosecutors have 
been elected after opposing mass incarceration.360 In late 2018, Congress 
passed a bipartisan federal sentencing reform—the FIRST STEP Act—by an 
overwhelming margin and with President Donald Trump’s support.361  While 
the legislation’s impact may be limited, it is the product of longstanding 
efforts to push Congress to address over-punitiveness.  Some reformers 
envision it as a building block toward wider changes.362 
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69, 71 (2012) (describing how 163 experts, including former federal judges, prosecutors, and 
U.S. Attorneys General, filed an amicus brief in support of a petty offender challenging the 
constitutionality of his fifty-five-year sentence, to no avail). 
 359 See, e.g., Anand Giridharadas, Momentum on Criminal Justice Repair, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/us/momentum-on-criminal-justice-
repair.html [https://perma.cc/VZ7H-M9MF]. 
 360 See Sklansky, supra note 258. 
 361 The acronym stands for “Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely 
Transitioning Every Person Act.” The House and Senate passed the bill by lopsided margins 
of 358-36 and 87-12, respectively. See S.756 - First Step Act of 2018, CONGRESS.GOV, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/756/all-actions?q=%7B%22search%22%
3A%5B%22%5C%22first+step+act%5C%22%22%5D%7D&r=5&overview=closed#tabs 
[https://perma.cc/4TQF-4X6V] (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). 
 362 See generally Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law—
and What Happens Next, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennan
center.org/blog/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next [https://perma.cc/R6
RA-X6NS]; Justin George, Okay, What’s the Second Step?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 19, 
2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/12/19/okay-what-s-the-second-step [https://
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These three shifts regarding mass incarceration in American society 
resemble the ones that Garland underlined for the death penalty: narrowed 
eligibility for harsh punishment, reduced frequency of punishment, and 
heightened social divide about the punishment’s propriety.363  Assessing how 
this shift compares to other Western democracies is more challenging than 
for the death penalty because they have never experienced American-style 
mass incarceration.  Yet the evolution of European penology has been 
marked by a narrowing scope of repressiveness, limited use of lengthy 
periods of incarceration, and greater skepticism toward the propriety of 
incarceration.364 
That being noted, America’s shift on mass incarceration should not be 
overestimated.  The existence of a bipartisan consensus for genuine criminal 
justice reform was already doubtful years before Donald Trump’s Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions raised eyebrows by directing federal prosecutors to 
systematically seek the harshest sentences possible.365  Even though 
President Trump later backed federal sentencing reform with the FIRST 
STEP Act, the legislation mainly aims to reduce punishments for select 
nonviolent offenders.366  Put otherwise, this legislation covers a segment of 
 
perma.cc/7789-9RHS]; Charlotte Resing, How the FIRST STEP Act Moves Criminal Justice 
Reform Forward, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smart-
justice/mass-incarceration/how-first-step-act-moves-criminal-justice-reform-forward [https://
perma.cc/7HDU-KS4B]. 
 363 Garland, supra note 19, at 355. 
 364 See supra Section II. Australia and New Zealand may be relative counter-examples to 
this trend in the West given that their increasingly harsh penal systems have made more 
offenders eligible for life sentences, including without parole. Still, their penal systems are 
drastically more moderate and humane than the United States’. See generally Fitz-Gibbon, 
supra note 181, at 75 (discussing life sentences in Australia); Oleson, supra note 195, at 278 
(noting that “the scope and scale of the New Zealand three-strikes system are modest” 
compared to U.S. three-strikes laws); Yvette Tinsley & Warren Young, Overuse in the 
Criminal Justice System in New Zealand, INT’L PENAL AND PENITENTIARY FOUNDATION SERIES 
(forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3031128 [https://perma.cc/8RCP-RHUZ] 
(describing punitive trends in New Zealand); WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 39 (indicating 
that Australia and New Zealand respectively have incarceration rates of 172 and 214 prisoners 
per resident, compared to 655 prisoners per resident in America). 
 365 As I described in Exceptional America, talk about a bipartisan consensus for criminal 
justice reform has existed for at least a decade despite limited change. See JOUET, supra note 
4, at 3–4, 204–07; see also Chris Suellentrop, The Right Has a Jailhouse Conversion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, at E46 (discussing an emerging bipartisan consensus for criminal justice 
reform); Sari Horwitz & Matt Zapotosky, Sessions Issues Sweeping New Criminal Charging 
Policy, WASH. POST (May 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/sessions-issues-sweeping-new-criminal-charging-policy/2017/05/11/4752bd42-369
7-11e7-b373-418f6849a004_story.html [https://perma.cc/3HWR-SHHE]. 
 366 See generally Keith Humphreys, We Have Nothing to Fear from Federal Sentencing 
Reform, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/27
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federal prisoners, who themselves are a segment of all prisoners nationwide 
since approximately 91% are in state prisons and local jails.367  In general, 
many Democratic and Republican politicians advocating for reform focus 
almost exclusively on nonviolent offenders, ignoring the fact that most state 
prisoners were convicted for violent crimes.368  The misconception that 
ending the “War on Drugs” will end mass incarceration has also hindered 
broader reform efforts.369  America’s incarceration rate remains immense.370 
The persistence of violent policing practices,371 the emergence of a wide 
surveillance apparatus in the digital age,372 and other infringements on civil 
liberties further call into question whether American justice has grown more 
humane, egalitarian, and democratic. 
Moreover, it is relevant to our theory that scarcely predictable swings 
and backlashes have marked the evolution of American justice in recent 
decades.  When the Supreme Court struck all death penalty statutes 
nationwide under the Eighth Amendment in 1972, it may have seemed that 
America was joining other Western democracies in abolishing capital 
punishment.373  States reacted by passing new death penalty statutes that the 
Court approved in 1976.374  Practically no other modern Western democracy 
has so far reintroduced capital punishment following its abolition.  New 
Zealand is a noteworthy exception, as it abolished the practice in 1941, 
briefly reintroduced it in 1950, and permanently abolished it in 1962.375  For 




 367 WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 201. 
 368 See Forman, supra note 36, at 24–25. 
 369 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 370 See generally WORLD PRISON BRIEF, supra note 39. 
 371 “The killings of citizens by police in 2016 is a phenomenon in the United States as it 
is in no other peaceful and fully developed nation on earth.” FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN 
POLICE KILL 247 (2017). The peculiar proliferation of firearms in America and the relatedly 
high rate of assaults on police significantly contribute to this phenomenon. Id. 
 372 As Bernard Harcourt describes, digital media has enabled the rise of a massive 
surveillance apparatus, although “[n]one of this should come entirely as a surprise. There is a 
long history of cooperation between tech companies—especially in communications and 
information delivery—and intelligence in this country and abroad,” as illustrated by spying 
on the American public’s telegrams back in the 1920s. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: 
DESIRE AND DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 67 (2015). 
 373 Steiker, supra note 258, at 86–88. 
 374 Id.; see also Gregg v Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976) (decision reintroducing the 
death penalty); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 238 (1972) (per curiam) (decision abolishing 
the death penalty). 
 375 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN 
AGENDA 9 (1986). 
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retain capital punishment.376  Aside from considerable geographic 
variations,377 patterns in the usage of the death penalty in American society 
have been unsteady.  After a drop in the 1970s, death sentences and 
executions surged in the United States, prompting Stuart Banner to observe 
that “[b]y the end of the twentieth century capital punishment [was] back 
with a vengeance.”378  Death sentences and executions then dropped again.379 
Mass incarceration likewise was a hardly foreseeable phenomenon.  
Until the 1960s, the legal norm and policy goal of rehabilitation was 
ingrained in the U.S. penal system.380  This model was mostly repudiated in 
subsequent decades as the “tough on crime” movement rose, and the prison 
population exploded.  But we saw above that ending mass incarceration has 
become a matter of recurrent debate in early twenty-first century America.  
Attitudes toward imprisonment in other Western democracies, such as 
France,381 the United Kingdom,382 Canada,383 and New Zealand,384 have also 
fluctuated between rehabilitative and punitive goals.  Certain European 
leaders advocating harsher justice have even called for emulating America’s 
“tough on crime” policies, illustrating another form of transatlantic 
convergence.385  Yet cyclical variations have occurred on a greater scale in 
the United States than in contemporary Western democracies, which have 
not experienced mass incarceration.  The U.S. penal system is comparatively 
less stable, partly reflecting broader polarization in modern America about 
 
 376 JOUET, supra note 4, at 218–24; ZIMRING, supra note 176, at 27, 39, 46–47. 
 377 Profound disparities exist both at the state and county levels. Since 1976 approximately 
52% of all executions in the United States stem from barely 2% of its counties. See DEATH 
PENALTY INFORMATION CTR., THE 2% DEATH PENALTY: HOW A MINORITY OF COUNTIES 
PRODUCE MOST DEATH CASES AT ENORMOUS COSTS TO ALL (2013), https://files.deathpenalty
info.org/documents/pdf/TwoPercentReport.f1564408816.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC43-KDN
M]. 
 378 BANNER, supra note 348, at 267. 
 379 DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 346, at 1–6. 
 380 See generally GARLAND, supra note 4, at 20, 58, 62, 143; Tonry, supra note 69 at 7–8. 
 381 See generally Hodgson & Soubise, supra note 216, at 221, 221–23, 239–40. 
 382 See generally GARLAND, supra note 4, at 60. 
 383 See generally Doob & Webster, Weathering the Storm?, supra note 190, at 410–11, 
414–15. 
 384 See generally John Pratt & Marie Clark, Penal Populism in New Zealand, 7 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 303 (2005); Tinsley & Young, supra note 364, at 17–31. Regarding the 
abolition, reintroduction, and re-abolition of the death penalty in New Zealand, see also 
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 375, at 9. 
 385 See WACQUANT, supra note 101, at 7–55 (discussing attempts to “export” harsh 
American justice to Europe). 
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whether to extend or radically roll back basic constitutional rights.386  By 
demonstrating that U.S. penal attitudes are not locked in stone, however, this 
state of impermanence suggests that American justice is amenable to the 
social transformations that have limited punitiveness elsewhere in the West. 
The evolution of juvenile justice in the United States epitomizes how 
paradigm shifts between rehabilitative and repressive concerns have shaped 
American law.  The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the 
creation of juvenile court systems aiming to protect children from traditional 
criminal law’s punitiveness.387  Although early juvenile courts could treat 
children harshly despite their benevolent rhetoric, they carried a therapeutic 
mandate.388  This objective was largely abandoned after the emergence of 
mass incarceration in the 1970s, when teenagers routinely faced merciless 
punishments.  In particular, the influential “super-predator” theory reversed 
the original juvenile justice system’s conception of teenagers as vulnerable 
persons in need of treatment, instead painting them as practically worse than 
adults due to their violent callousness.389  The main proponent of the “super-
predator” scare, the criminologist John DiIulio, ultimately disavowed his 
own research390 and joined an amicus brief that criminologists filed in Miller 
to oppose life without parole for juveniles.391 
Building on Graham, the Court’s decision in Miller bolstered a national 
reform movement leading the number of states banning life imprisonment 
without parole for juveniles to quadruple between 2012 and 2018.392  As of 
October 2019, twenty-two states had banned the practice.393  They include 
 
 386 These circumstances reflect particularly profound partisan divisions in American 
society over a wide range of basic legal and policy issues, including the role of government, 
wealth inequality, race, religion, and human rights. See JOUET, supra note 4, at 27–39. 
 387 CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 29 (3d ed. 1991); Sanford J. 
Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: A Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1207 (1970). 
 388 See generally SIMONSEN, supra note 387 at 29, 35; DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: IN RE GAULT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 3, 8–11 (2011); 
Fox, supra note 387, at 1207. 
 389 See Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has 
Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at 19. 
 390 Id. 
 391 Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Miller, 567 U.S. 
at 460 (No. 10-9646), 2012 WL 174240 (“Amicus Brief of Criminologists in Miller”). 
 392 CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, Washington State Supreme Court 
Rules Life Without Parole for Children Unconstitutional (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.fair
sentencingofyouth.org/washington-state-supreme-court-rules-life-without-parole-children-un
constitutional/ [https://perma.cc/XF6H-KC4C] (noting that five states abolished life without 
parole for juveniles in 2012, whereas twenty-one had done so by the end of 2018). 
 393 CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, States that Ban Life without Parole 
for Children, supra note 14. 
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predominantly liberal states like Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont, 
as well as predominantly conservative states like Texas, Utah, and 
Wyoming.394  Sim Gill, the District Attorney for Salt Lake County, Utah, 
illustratively declared that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions inspired “a 
major paradigm shift in how the state can and will pursue just outcomes in 
cases involving juveniles who commit serious crimes.”395  He thus embraced 
the Utah state legislature’s decision to eliminate life without the possibility 
of parole for minors, finding it a “sound policy” because “given time, 
juveniles can outgrow antisocial adolescent behavior.”396  California 
reformers equally pointed to Miller for support as the state amended its 
statute on the transfer of juveniles to criminal court by stipulating that judges 
may consider mitigating circumstances regarding teenage impetuosity and 
mental development.397 
Several state courts have drawn upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment analysis as persuasive authority to find broader rights for 
juveniles under their state constitutions.398  In the words of the Iowa Supreme 
Court, “[w]e have generally accepted the principles enunciated by the United 
States Supreme Court in the Roper, Graham, and Miller trilogy in our 
interpretation of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution,”399 which also 
forbids “cruel and unusual punishment.”400  In 2016, it held that inflicting life 
without parole sentences on juveniles was unconstitutional per se under the 
Iowa Constitution.401  In 2018, the Washington Supreme Court found this 
sentence to be categorically “cruel punishment” under the state’s 
constitution.402  It added that even if meting out life without parole to a 
teenager were not inherently “cruel,” it would be constitutionally 
“disproportionate” to culpability.403 
 
 394 See CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS, supra note 
13, at 4. 
 395 Id. at 11. 
 396 Id. 
 397 S. Rules Comm., B. Analysis, S.B. 382, 2015-16 Reg. Sess. (Cal. Aug. 13, 2015). 
 398 For a broader discussion of state court decisions spurred by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Graham line of cases, see Sarah French Russell & Tracy L. Denholtz, Procedures for 
Proportionate Sentences: The Next Wave of Eighth Amendment Noncapital Litigation, 48 
CONN. L. REV. 1121 (2016). 
 399 Iowa v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 833–34 (Iowa 2016). 
 400 IOWA CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 401 Sweet, 879 N.W.2d at 811. 
 402 Washington v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 352-55 (Wash. 2018); see also WASH. CONST. 
art. I, § 14. 
 403 Bassett, 428 P.3d at 354–55. 
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Because criminal justice in America is primarily run at the state and 
local levels, scholars have correctly underlined that neither the U.S. Supreme 
Court nor the federal government as a whole can singlehandedly put an end 
to mass incarceration.404  At the same time, the evolution of state juvenile 
justice in the aftermath of Graham, Miller, and Montgomery demonstrates 
that a symbiotic relationship can exist between federal and state law—to boot 
one tied to the Eighth Amendment’s evolution. 
These developments should not obscure how American juvenile justice 
remains exceptionally harsh by international standards.405  By some 
measures, “the gulf in incarceration rates between America and other 
Western democracies nowadays is even worse for children than for 
adults.”406  For example, the overall incarceration rate in the United States is 
respectively nine times and eleven times higher than the rate for Germany 
and Sweden.407  But the U.S. juvenile incarceration rate is respectively 
fourteen times and eighty-four times higher than for these nations.408  The 
rest of the Western world bans life sentences and other lengthy prison terms 
for juveniles.409  By comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a limited 
step in that direction.  In Miller, the Justices declined to categorically abolish 
life without parole for juveniles.410  Beside (nonmandatory) life without 
parole in murder cases, adolescents can still receive ordinary life sentences 
(with the possibility of parole) or extremely lengthy prison terms (say twenty 
 
 404 For instance, John Pfaff has argued that “[t]he federal government cannot end mass 
incarceration. Ending it will require state-by-state, even county-by-county fights.” John Pfaff, 
Bill Clinton Is Wrong about His Crime Bill. So Are the Protesters He Lectured, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/magazine/bill-clinton-is-wr
ong-about-his-crime-bill-so-are-the-protesters-he-lectured.html?partner=bloomberg [https://
perma.cc/2UUB-H6A7]; see also Gottschalk, supra note 14, at 357. By the same token, I 
previously emphasized that “profound change will probably have to happen at the state and 
local level.” JOUET, supra note 4, at 204. 
 405 “[M]any juvenile justice advocates and scholars” view America as “a problematic case 
not to be followed due to its more punitive approach to juvenile cases.” Franklin E. Zimring 
and Máximo Langer, One Theme or Many? The Search for a Deep Structure in Global 
Juvenile Justice, in JUVENILE JUSTICE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 383, 401 (Zimring, Langer & 
David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2015). 
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 408 NEAL HAZEL, CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF YOUTH JUSTICE, YOUTH JUSTICE 
BOARD FOR ENGLAND AND WALES 59 (2008). 
 409 JOUET, supra note 4, at 218–19. 
 410 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012). 
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to fifty years) for other types of convictions.411  Stark racial disparities persist, 
including in states where the reform movement has gained traction.412 
Certain states have also resisted the Supreme Court’s directive to 
reconsider draconian juvenile punishments.  In 2018, the Louisiana Parole 
Board refused to release the prisoner at the heart of the prominent 
Montgomery ruling, in which the Justices decided to retroactively apply 
Miller’s holding prohibiting life without parole as a mandatory sentence for 
a child.413  Henry Montgomery, who is African-American, was seventy-one 
years old by the time the parole board reviewed the mandatory life without 
parole sentence he received at seventeen for murdering a police officer.  The 
Board voted by a 2-1 margin to keep him behind bars.414 Furthermore, 
prosecutors in Louisiana, as in numerous other states, retain considerable 
discretion to pursue draconian juvenile sentences.  Louisiana prosecutors 
have sought life without parole in one third of the 258 juvenile cases eligible 
for resentencing under Montgomery, namely the same sentence as before.415 
Nevertheless, since Montgomery, states have halved the number of 
persons serving juvenile life without parole, both through resentencing 
hearings and state legislative reforms.416  Alongside the twenty-two states 
that have abolished this punishment, another six did not use it as of October 
2019.417  These developments constitute a shift away from the ultra-punitive 
ideology that characterized juvenile justice for several decades in the age of 
the “super-predator” theory418 and a relative return toward the therapeutic 
mandate that juvenile justice carried before mass incarceration emerged.419  
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From this historical perspective, the evolution of American justice appears to 
reflect societal instability rather than an immutable status quo. 
Yet how does one reconcile this instability with the hypothesis that 
America might be on a parallel trajectory as other Western democracies in 
narrowing eligibility for the harshest prison terms, reducing the frequency of 
their application, and facing a heightened social divide about these 
punishments’ propriety?420 Instability and steadiness of direction may seem 
to be mutually exclusive. 
In reality, it is possible for a society’s penal system to historically move 
in a particular direction, such as by gradually eliminating harsh punishments, 
and for penal attitudes in that society to simultaneously fluctuate between 
repressive and humanitarian concerns.  Political science data reflecting the 
existence of cycles in American politics provide a lens into this phenomenon.  
Since the 1950s, the political climate has fluctuated between the left and 
right.421  The public’s mood has additionally swung to the right when liberals 
were in power, and to the left when conservatives were.422  Attitudes toward 
crime can similarly be more or less conservative or liberal depending on the 
period.423  This situation is not limited to the United States.  Illustratively, 
France abolished the death penalty in 1981, and its modern penal system 
seldom metes out lengthy prison sentences.424  In past decades, changes in 
the French political climate have nonetheless contributed to the periodic rise 
and fall of politicians advocating a harsher penal system.425  Like a 
seismograph moving steadily forward notwithstanding how its needle can 
swing up or down, French law has gone in a given direction despite how the 
social climate swings between repressive or humane concerns.  This does not 
signify that French justice is necessarily on the path to progress, as Michel 
Foucault’s analysis of subtle forms of modern social control demonstrates.426  
The analogy to the steady direction of a seismograph also has limitations.  
Because the law is a social construct, its direction may someday reverse itself 
altogether or lead to uncharted territory.  Contrary to Francis Fukuyama’s 
theory, it is doubtful that the advent of liberal democracy in the West will 
mark the “end of history.”427  For instance, the rise of far-right European 
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 425 See generally id. at 223, 236–37. 
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political parties aiming to institute illiberal democracies or authoritarian 
regimes, dismantle the European Union, and repeal human rights standards, 
including international law requiring E.U. members to abolish the death 
penalty,428 readily belie rigid historicism.429  History does not follow a set of 
laws.  Still, the law has a history.  Scholars can identify trends, patterns, and 
fluctuations.  None are invulnerable to change but they may exist for a 
historical period, which may range from decades to centuries or the 
foreseeable future. 
How does this account relate to seminal theories regarding the 
evolutionary trajectory of criminal punishments in liberal democracies? 
Émile Durkheim predicted that punishments would milden over time due to 
the elimination of corporal sanctions, the death penalty’s decline, and the 
normalization of incarceration as a mode of punishment.430  As we saw 
above, Durkheim considered that greater respect for the human dignity of the 
prisoner played a role in this process.431   Foucault concurred that liberal 
democracies gradually became less brutal in their modes of punishment yet 
called into question Durkheim’s theory of increasing mildness.432  
Nonviolent punishments, in Foucault’s view, are primarily “a new tactic of 
power” aiming to control prisoners rather than expand their individual 
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 431 See id. and accompanying text. 
 432 FOUCAULT, supra note 174, at 31. 
764 JOUET [Vol. 109 
liberty.433  The theory of impermanence advanced in my Article appears 
compatible with both Durkheim and Foucault’s claims.  If Western 
democracies are converging in reducing the scope of repressiveness, it may 
reflect either, or perhaps both, a Durkheimian trend toward milder 
punishments and a Foucauldian trend toward insidious forms of social 
control. 
My theory evokes a seismograph that regularly swings up or down while 
moving steadily in a particular direction.  American justice may cyclically 
oscillate between repressive or humanitarian aspirations and simultaneously 
converge with other Western democracies in gradually limiting or abolishing 
the harshest punishments over the long term.  On a seismograph, a terrible 
earthquake may occur.  This may be one way to perceive mass 
incarceration—an intense social shock but not the permanent essence of 
American punishment.  On the other hand, it could be that mass incarceration 
was such a profound shock that it has fundamentally destabilized and altered 
American justice.  Ideological proclivities, discriminatory motives, 
institutional dynamics, and political incentives to routinely inflict harsh 
punishments may persist.  Nevertheless, even if mass incarceration lasts, the 
theory may hold true for the gradual abolition of the harshest punishments in 
the United States, including life without parole and the death penalty.  In any 
event, neither of these potential scenarios signifies that utopia awaits.  Social 
injustices abound in modern Europe, despite the absence of mass 
incarceration, life without parole, and executions. 
In sum, the paradigm shift in American penal philosophy may reflect 
more than a shift at the Supreme Court, including the evolving judicial 
philosophies of Anthony Kennedy and other influential Justices.  It might 
therefore continue over time, notwithstanding Kennedy’s retirement and 
replacement by Brett Kavanaugh, a Trump appointee.  In addition to the 
Eighth Amendment’s broadening interpretation, we saw that non-negligible 
reforms have occurred at the state level, and that the long-term trajectory of 
American justice might be relatively consistent with wider developments in 
Western sensibilities.  The disproportional attention devoted to the 
idiosyncrasies of swing Justices has not only overshadowed these patterns, 
but also the fact that idiosyncrasies are far from unique to the United States.  
At first glance, one may likewise be tempted to dismiss the growing 
importance of dignity in German law434 as merely the product of soul-
searching and atonement for the Holocaust and other atrocities of the Third 
 
 433 Id. (author’s translation). 
 434 See Luc Heuschling, La dignité de l’être humain dans la jurisprudence 
constitutionnelle allemande, in LA DIGNITÉ SAISIE PAR LES JUGES EN EUROPE 115, supra note 
160, 115–27. 
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Reich.  While these peculiarities have partly shaped the evolution of German 
law,435 dignity has gained significance in diverse Western societies.436  
Similarly, one may be inclined to claim that France’s abolition of the death 
penalty in 1981 reflected nothing more than the election of President François 
Mitterrand and his Socialist government that year, after the left-wing had 
been out of power for several decades.437  Such a “Mitterrand effect” might 
indeed be the most immediate reason why France abolished capital 
punishment in 1981 and not earlier.  However, a wider analytical framework 
demonstrates that France’s abolition of the death penalty is consistent with a 
trend in the Western world toward reducing the scope of the harshest 
punishments.  Each Western democracy plausibly has its own version of 
America’s “Kennedy effect,” France’s “Mitterrand effect,” or Germany’s 
“Holocaust atonement effect,” namely historically contingent factors 
involving human agency that played a role in penal reform.  These factors 
should not eclipse broader trends in diverse Western societies, which may 
inch forward on a rather comparable path through different social 
circumstances.  The United States does not appear to be a permanent 
exception to this trend.438  At the very least, this historical and comparative 
perspective may provide a more nuanced picture of American exceptionalism 
in the age of mass incarceration. 
CONCLUSION 
If mass incarceration were an edifice, its pillars would include the 
negation of human dignity, the disproportionality of punishment to 
culpability, the pursuit of illegitimate policy objectives, and hopelessness for 
the prisoner whose rehabilitation is irrelevant.  The Supreme Court’s 
landmark decisions in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery challenged all these 
pillars of mass incarceration.439  While they did so in juvenile life without 
 
 435 Id. at 115, 119. The concept of dignity in modern German law has multiple roots 
besides repentance for the Nazis’ atrocities, as it predated the Third Reich’s rise. See id. at 
115–17, 120, 125–27. 
 436 See, e.g., id. at 120–23 (noting that the advent of dignity in German law tended to 
parallel its growing influence in Western Europe and other regions, especially in the post-
World War Two era); see also supra Section II.A (describing the growing influence of dignity 
in the penal systems of Western democracies). 
 437 See generally ZIMRING, supra note 176, at 22 (analyzing how France’s abolition 
reflected a European shift, although Mitterrand’s election led to the national reform). 
 438 See Garland, supra note 19, at 355. 
 439 Empirical evidence indicates that systemic racial discrimination is another driving 
factor behind mass incarceration, although the Court has been disinclined to address this issue 
for decades. In comparison, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved significantly since 
Graham. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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parole cases, their reasoning could largely apply to adults facing draconian 
prison terms. 
The treatment of age nonetheless remains a key point of divergence 
between European and American punishment, as the Eighth Amendment may 
be evolving toward a strict age carve-out separating adolescent from adult 
prisoners.  This outcome would partly reflect the focus on neurological and 
behavioral science that the Justices drew upon in concluding that juveniles 
are more impulsive than adults and grow more mature with age.440  As Rachel 
Barkow noted, “social science data about the reduced culpability of 
juveniles” may have “tipped the scales” in Graham and Miller.441  “Without 
similar data about the capacity for change in adults, it is unlikely that the 
Supreme Court will want to take the same categorical leap” in cases 
involving adults.442  Graham and its progeny could thereby lead to a rigid 
“juveniles are different” doctrine that would not extend these Eighth 
Amendment protections to adult prisoners.  In fact, by pitting malleable 
children against supposedly irredeemable adults, the “juveniles are different” 
framework could serve to rationalize grossly excessive prison terms for those 
over eighteen.443 
Even though a detailed discussion of age carve-outs is beyond this 
Article’s scope, it is relevant that the narrow “juveniles are different” doctrine 
rests on an incomplete understanding of the relationship between age and 
crime.  Firstly, the prefrontal cortex of the brain regulating impulse control 
does not complete its maturation process until approximately the mid-
twenties.444  Secondly, it is well established that human beings in America 
and other Western societies tend to “age out” of crime, as the crime rate rises 
in adolescence, peaks around twenty years old, and then gradually declines 
before flattening by the fifties.445  These two scientific elements call into 
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question a categorical cutoff under which the Eighth Amendment’s bar on 
“cruel and unusual punishments” would apply to certain draconian prison 
terms inflicted on juveniles but fully exclude people once they turn eighteen 
under the pretense that adult offenders are normally irredeemable, unlike 
children.  In other words, the rigid “juveniles are different” doctrine is 
inconsistent with the very body of science from which it stems. 
The focus on the differences between juveniles and adults in the 
aftermath of Graham has overshadowed a measure of convergence between 
America and other Western democracies after decades of considerable 
divergence.  We saw in this Article that three relative shifts relevant to mass 
incarceration in the United States are analogous to the shifts that David 
Garland observed concerning the evolution of the death penalty in the West: 
narrowed eligibility for punishment, reduced frequency of punishment, and 
heightened social divide about the punishment’s propriety.446 
My comparative theory regarding the evolution of criminal punishment 
and Western sensibilities suggests a state of impermanence.  American justice 
may cyclically ebb and flow between repressive or humanitarian approaches 
and simultaneously converge with the rest of the West in limiting or 
abolishing the harshest punishments over the long term.  Divergence 
continues to greatly exceed convergence and the ethos of modern American 
justice helps explain mass incarceration,447 but norms are social constructs. 
A lengthy status quo can sometimes appear as an eternal state of affairs, yet 
it seldom is. 
The history of modern criminal justice scholarship sheds light on why 
these patterns have received insufficient attention.  The exceptional 
punitiveness of modern American law has led scholars to concentrate on its 
divergence from Europe.  This has at times fostered both fatalism and 
essentialism about the irredeemable ruthlessness of American justice.  A 
profound divergence does exist nowadays, as my own scholarship has 
emphasized,448 although a few generations ago American justice was not 
drastically harsher than in Europe or elsewhere in the West. 
Should America keep converging with other Western democracies in 
coming decades, the attenuation or end of mass incarceration will not herald 
utopia.  Imprisonment is not the sole form of harsh social treatment.  A just 
penal system is an ideal that may always remain as elusive as genuine 
democracy.  Societies may still inch toward these ideals. 
 
 446 Garland, supra note 19, at 355. 
 447 For a cogent description of distinct norms in modern American and European justice, 
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Time will tell whether the ongoing developments in American penal 
philosophy will have broader implications for adult prisoners or whether they 
will remain mostly limited to juvenile justice.  The history of American 
criminal punishment, like perhaps all of history, can reflect unpredictable 
swings, backlashes, regressions, and transformations.  So far, the Supreme 
Court has contributed to a relevant paradigm shift.  Due to an oft-overlooked 
symbiotic relationship between federal and state law, the Justices’ seminal 
juvenile decisions bolstered state reform movements.449  Certain states that 
once led the nation in passing merciless juvenile sentencing laws, such as 
Texas, categorically abolished life without parole for minors.450  This historic 
reversal suggests that a future paradigm shift regarding the rights of adult 
prisoners cannot be dismissed. 
 
 
 449 See supra notes 14, 393–401 and accompanying text. 
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4; see also Amicus Brief of Criminologists in Miller, supra note 391, at 30 (“Texas greatly 
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